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ABSTRACT 
AL HANDHALI, KHALIL, YAHYA, Masters  : June : 2019, Gulf Studies 
Title: National Identity and its Impact on Shaping Oman's Contemporary Foreign 
Policy. 
Supervisor of Thesis: Afyare, Abdi, Elmi. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the concept of national identity and its 
impact in the process of foreign policy decision-making by using a constructivist 
approach, with a particular focus on Oman’s foreign policy. The thesis attempts to 
demonstrate the degree to which the components of national identity in the Omani case 
are highly influential in foreign policy decision-making. The reason of choosing 
national identity in this research refers to the fact that it might be difficult to understand 
Oman’s contemporary foreign policy which is characterized by an independent and 
neutral approach, without first mapping the role of identity that shaped this approach.  
The main question of the thesis is that; to what extent does national identity and 
its components influence Oman’s foreign policy? In doing so, the study has conducted 
a qualitative research method and employed both primary and secondary resources. The 
findings of the study confirmed the argument that Oman’s contemporary foreign policy 
is driven largely by the national identity and its components which include (historical 
dimension, geographical location, cultural and civilizational heritage, religious aspect). 
The research concluded by arguing that although the succession process in Oman is 
problematic and there is uncertainty of whether Oman will maintain its foreign policy 
orientation after Qaboos’s reign; however it is unlikely that it will change its foreign 
policy dramatically as the components of its national identity will continue to determine 
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the action of any future leader in Oman. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since 1979, the Gulf region has gone through different political phases and 
developments, being one of the most volatile areas of the world. The Iranian revolution 
in 1979, Afghanistan’s invasion by the Soviet, the long conflict between Iran and Iraq 
(1981-1988), Kuwait’s invasion in 1991 of so-called the second Gulf war, American 
attack on Iraq in 2003, and the Arab Spring are some of the important events the region 
has witnessed, since 1979 (Akseki, 2010). Political instability in the region has 
continued until recently, whereby the Gulf Cooperation Council is witnessing an 
unprecedented crisis in the form of the blockade imposed on Qatar and the division it 
has caused to the whole Gulf bloc. All these issues took place in one of the most 
important regions in the world due to the availability of large quantities of oil reserves. 
As such, any disruption of oil flow from this region would undoubtedly cause serious 
implications in other parts of the world. It is for this reason, the greater powers, mainly 
the US, UK and Russia are exerting numerous efforts to maintain their interests, and 
this cannot be achieved without preserving the stability of the region and their allies 
(Rieger, 2013). 
Within this unstable and volatile area, Sultanate of Oman has pursued a 
balanced foreign policy orientation which is characterized by independence and 
neutrality. This policy has resulted in maintaining good relations with many countries 
(Al-Khalili, 2009). Investigating the real motives behind Oman’s foreign policy 
deserves detailed academic attention due to its unique experiment as well as the 
presence of national identity components that cannot be found in its neighbors. In 
reviewing the preceding literature conducted in this field, it became clear that there is a 
common denominator in most of these studies. The majority of these studies are 
wondering about the real motives and dynamics behind Oman’s independent foreign 
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policy, bearing in mind, its limited economic and military abilities. On many occasions, 
its political decisions have taken a contrary direction of its counterparts in the GCC and 
Saudi Arabia in particular. Many Scholars argue that Oman’s political decision is based 
on what meets its interests and corresponds to the principles it believes. 
There are many scholars that examine Oman’s foreign policy. Studies such as; 
Kechichian (1995), Al-Khalili (2009) and Baabood (2016) are the most comprehensive 
and significant literature conducted in this filed among many others like Akseki (2010), 
Lefebvre (2009) and AlRahma (2015). In his investigation, Kechichian (1995) contends 
that the historical dimension acts as a key element in the formation of current Oman’s 
foreign policy. He further illustrates that due to its strategic location, it was subjected 
to colonial powers’ rivalries such as Portugal, Holland and Britain. These foreign 
powers were competing to maintain control over the Muscat government either by 
signing a treaty of friendships with the Omani authorities or by force. Despite the fact 
that this rivalry and external interventions over Oman led to internal division, it had a 
greater impact, on the other hand, in developing social awareness of Omani people to 
defend their territories and being independent of any external influence.  As such, by 
the early 18th century, the Ya’aribah Dynasty, ruling the country at that time, expelled 
the Portuguese and the Persians from Muscat and other parts of the Gulf (Lefebvre, 
2010). During the mid-19th century, Oman’s expansion reached its peak. This expansion 
helped Omani traders to export goods and other materials to other parts of the world. 
The growth of trade and other commercial activities had coincided with the flow of 
people and migration from numerous ethnic and tribal origins all the way to Oman 
(Bontebal, 2015). By the time, these people had taken from Oman as a place of 
residence and had lived there for generations which in turn, had created a sort of 
unprecedented shape of multi-culturalism that is rarely found in its neighbors. This 
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social harmony and ethnic diversity is the root cause of tolerance, acceptance others 
and peaceful coexistence that Oman enjoys at present. These values and principles have 
been further promoted and practiced by the Ibadhi doctrine, which is adopted by the 
majority of Omani people (Baabood, 2017).  
Among the aforementioned factors that contributed to shaping Oman’s 
contemporary foreign policy, Sultan Qaboos is the key figure that engineered the 
country’s unique approach. Since he assumed power in 1970, he pursued a new vision 
to extract the state from isolation and restore its former glory. The main principles that 
distinguish Oman’s foreign policy under his rule are independence, neutrality, solving 
conflicts through dialogue and peace talks, tolerance and non-intervention with the 
internal affairs of other countries (Kechichian, 1995).  
All these components discussed above (historical dimension, strategic 
geography, cultural and civilizational heritage and religious aspect) combined together 
to form a distinctive identity to the state. Thereby, the main argument of this research 
study is that the current independent approach practiced by Oman’s foreign policy is 
derived largely by the national identity and its various components. In investigating the 
influence of national identity on Oman’s foreign policy, a qualitative method has been 
conducted of both primary and secondary resources. This will be further explained in 
the coming sections. 
Research Problem 
The main problem this thesis attempts to shed light on is the raising question of 
what influences Oman to pursue a neutral and independent approach. This approach 
has caused misunderstanding within the Gulf Cooperation Council states in particular, 
as Oman is accused of adopting agendas that hinder the interests of the GCC such as its 
position from the proposed unified currency as well as its rejection of being part of the 
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Gulf Union. Because of its position from the Gulf union in particular, a wide argument 
has been raised among some critics and analysts from neighboring countries claiming 
that the Sultanate is acting outside the GCC consensus (Baabood, 2017). In addition, 
Oman has strong ties with Iran compared to other countries that view Iran as a main 
threat to the region. Within this cloudy and blurry understanding of the real motives 
behind such political approach, this study attempts to shed light on the problem by 
addressing the missing link that prompts Oman to follow its independent foreign policy 
and illustrating the role of national identity in shaping this political approach. In 
addition, there are limited studies that examine and analyze Oman’s foreign policy from 
the perspective of national identity, notably those related to the foreign policy of Arab 
countries and Gulf states in particular. 
Research Significance 
Given that there has been little research conducted to investigate the impact of 
identity on orienting the foreign policy of the states, this study attempts to provide a 
clear and extensive analysis to researchers and those who are interested in 
understanding the dynamics of the states’ foreign policy. The study focus on the  case 
of Oman, as it is one of the few states in the Middle East that enjoys a high level of 
independence in practicing its foreign policy. There are several examples that 
demonstrate Oman’s independent foreign policy whether in the Gulf, regional, and 
international levels. The research will examine and analyze the role of national identity 
that shapes this unique foreign policy and the elements that structured this. 
Besides, what reinforces to carry out such research is the need to bridge the gap 
between the divergent views towards Oman’s foreign policy by clarifying the 
contradictions in this regard especially those who pose questions and criticism about its 
neutral and independent path. Meanwhile, the results and findings that will be obtained 
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through this research could be applied -to some extent- to other Gulf countries, given 
that these countries have some common characteristics such as; similar monarchical 
systems besides other cultural and religious denominators. 
Moreover, the finding of this research might be useful as a reference for 
researchers and those who are interested in studying and analyzing the trends of states’ 
foreign policy within the Arabian region and how identity is involved in shaping its 
approaches. In addition, the finding could be beneficial for those working in the 
research fields in Oman as well as those in the government political institutions as it 
presents a different perspective of understanding the fundamental driven factors behind 
Oman’s foreign policy and how decision-making system is implemented in such 
environment. It is expected that addressing the concept of national identity and its role 
in shaping the behavior of any state would add a contribution to the preceding literature 
that study and analyze states’ foreign policy. It will also open up new and exciting fields 
of comparative research with the Middle East and beyond. 
Research Objectives 
The main objective of the thesis is to examine the concept of national identity 
and its impact on shaping Oman’s foreign policy. In doing so, the study employs a 
constructivist approach. This country has been chosen due to its unique approach in the 
region, which enabled it to establish good relations with many countries around the 
world. Furthermore, Oman acted as a mediator to solving some of the complicated 
issues in the region. There are many examples that support this argument, starting from 
Oman’s contribution to solving the Iranian nuclear program and its role in releasing 
some of the western hostages. 
Research Question(s) 
In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, this thesis attempts to 
provide answers to the following key questions: 
  
6 
 
The main question: 
To what extent does national identity influence/impact Oman’s foreign policy? 
The secondary questions: 
What are the factors or elements that have contributed to shape the national 
identity of Oman? 
How does Oman and its leadership employ these factors in drawing the 
Sultanate’s foreign policy? 
Research Methodology 
Based on the research question, the research methodology follows a qualitative 
case study method. Filstead’s (1970) offers a simple definition of qualitative research 
method which is “firsthand involvement with the social word” (p.23). This initial and 
simple definition had been further analyzed and expanded by Goldstein (1991) arguing 
that “firsthand implies the context of the investigation, the immediate on-site setting in 
which qualitative method is employed, and involvement refers to the actual 
participation of the researcher to the social word being studied” (p.103). In contrast, 
Tutty, Rothery, and Grinnel (1996) provided a more expanded definition of qualitative 
research methods as “The study of people in their natural environments, as they go 
about their daily lives. It tries to examine how individuals live, how they talk and 
behave and more importantly, it strives to understand “the meaning peoples’ words and 
behaviors have for them” (p.4). Contrary to quantitative methods whereby numbers and 
numeric outputs are its main characteristics, the data in qualitative methods are 
conveyed through words and text production (Creswell, 2013). These data involve 
direct quotations about people experiences, feelings and opinions of a certain issue 
taken through interviews, observations and documents (Merriam & Tisdell, 2013). In 
the same context, Merriam (1998) identifies six criteria that differ qualitative research 
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methods from quantitative in terms of their focus, design, assumptions, goal, data 
collection and the findings. Patton (2015), according to Merriam and Tisdell, has 
discussed 16 types of inquiry within the qualitative research methods. Some of them 
are commonly used, whereas the majority are less common and rarely used such as 
semiotics and chaos theory. However, for this study, Merriam and Tisdell’s 
classification has been used. They have chosen six of the more commonly used 
approaches to doing qualitative: basic or generic, grounded theory, case study, narrative 
analysis, ethnographic and phenomenology (Merriam & Tisdell, 2013). 
 In conducting this research, a qualitative case study method has been chosen. 
There are two reasons for this choice. First, the purpose of this study is to explore the 
role of national identity in shaping Oman’s foreign policy. To do so, applying a 
qualitative research method is the appropriate manner that would help me to conduct 
this task, given that the major goals of qualitative research include description and 
understanding as well as explain and predict (Merriam, 1998). The second reason is 
related to personal considerations, as I feel more familiar to use qualitative method 
rather than quantitative. Using this method to discuss humanitarian issues and those 
related to state and society, largely fit my social personality. Exposing myself to 
peoples’ life and understanding their culture and knowledge is really interesting for me 
and I see myself more creative in this area rather than dealing with numbers and 
analysis. Furthermore, besides the benefits I would gain from publishing my research, 
contributing to the field of social and political issues as well as providing suggestions 
and recommendations to decision-makers are also among the reasons that motivated me 
to do so. Thus, the qualitative method appeals to me and raise my satisfaction to a large 
extent. Merriam & Tisdell (2013) argue that as with the other types of qualitative 
research, a qualitative case study has some defining characteristics. It shares with other 
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types the search for meaning and understanding, an inductive investigative strategy and 
the end product being richly descriptive.  
With regard to data collection, both primary and secondary sources have been 
used. Beside secondary literature that provides insights to the research study, a 
collection of documents have also been used. There are two types of documents used 
in this regard: one is considered as a primary source which comes in the form of official 
documents and archives. The other one is a secondary source which represents press or 
media products. While documents offer a valuable opportunity to deeply analyze and 
investigate the studied area, Meriam (1998) argues that the researcher has to evaluate 
the validity and authenticity of the document he wants to use.  
Taking this into consideration, the objective of using documents in this research 
is to enrich the analysis. Many Scholars have argued that documents sustain and protect 
the memories of a certain state. For instance, Al Salimi & Michael (2012) argue that 
documents hold the legacy of individuals past and their activities practiced in a certain 
territory as well as the raw material of their history. Documents are valuable sources 
that could help scholars to search for the truths and correct the contradictions and 
shortcomings in some literature. In addition to their contribution to knowledge, 
documents’ significance goes beyond that into recording the evolution of civilizations 
and the activities of people involved in a certain territory (Al Salimi & Michael, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Given that this research aims to examine the role of national identity in shaping 
Oman’s foreign policy, it is essential then to investigate the contribution of the 
preceding literature in this area. In doing so, this Chapter is structured into two main 
parts. While, the first one focuses on the literature conducted to analyze Oman’s foreign 
policy, the second section investigates how state identity is being perceived and 
described theoretically through different schools of international relations theories. 
Literature Review 
The literature review is separated into two main sections. Firstly, the literature 
surrounding Oman's Identity is reviewed and then the literature on Oman's foreign 
policy. Regarding identity, there is literature that examines how some states created 
their own identity to achieve their objectives and its influence on their foreign policy 
orientation (Barnett, 1999). It is worth noting that Oman's identity is characterized by 
three main elements: history, culture, geography. Thereby, some literature provides 
insight in this regard as will be discussed. 
The second part of literature analyzes Oman's foreign policy during its modern 
history particularly, when Sultan Qaboos assumed power in 1970. These studies 
highlight the most important events that shaped Oman's contemporary independent and 
neutral approach by addressing the domestic, regional and international conditions, and 
analyzing Oman’s policies towards these circumstances (Akseki, 2010). In addition to 
this, literature that is devoted to discussing a single case study will be used in analyzing 
Oman's foreign policy. For instance, Oman's behavior with the Iranian nuclear program 
or its behavior towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Indeed, it could be argued that most of the preceding literature conducted in this 
regard focus on analyzing Oman's foreign policy since its modern history which trace 
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the events after Sultan Qaboos assumed power in 1970 without taking enough 
consideration of Oman's legacy and its rich experiment before Sultan Qaboos' reign. 
Other literature like the study of Riphenburg (1998) titled: “Oman: Political 
development in a changing world” focuses on discussing the formation of the state 
through the history and the influence of this on developing its political experience 
without providing enough analysis of the real motives and factors behind Oman’s 
contemporary foreign policy. It is worth mentioning that studies which are completely 
devoted to analyzing Oman’s foreign policy are fairly limited with the exception of two 
important and comprehensive studies: “Oman and the World: The Emergence of 
Independent Foreign Policy” by Joseph Kechichian as well as the study of Majid Al-
Khalili titled “Oman’s Foreign Policy, Foundations and Practice”. Despite their 
valuable contribution, both of them neglect to consider one of the main elements that 
shape current Oman’s foreign policy which is national/state identity.  
As stated earlier, and according to the research question, two main themes of 
literature are reviewed as follows:  
1. The Interrelation between Identity and Foreign Policy 
According to Sen (2007), Identity is “the reference that explains how a certain 
individual, institute, organization, company or state behave” (P. 18). Some argue that 
in order to analyze the behavior of individuals, one needs to concentrate on their 
identities which hold valuable information (Rutherford, 1990). Applying this concept 
is also helpful to understand how national identity may influence a certain state to 
follow a particular foreign policy approach. This identity is a mixture of cultural and 
social experiences that have grown throughout history and ended in forming a unique 
character to a certain nation. Identity, in turn, can be described as "a collection of 
cultures, customs, traditions, and civilization of a particular people or state and the code 
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by which the person can identify himself in relation to the social group to which he 
belongs" (Sen, 2007, p. 25). 
It is important to understand the concept of identity in Oman before addressing 
what makes Oman's foreign policy unique in the region. Oman enjoyed good trade and 
communication with the outside world since early history, helped in creating a sort of 
multiculturalism due to the trade movement and people migration in and out 
(Jones,2014). This has made the Omani culture cultivate the principles of tolerance and 
accepting others and aversion to sectarian conflict. Sen (2007) also explains the role of 
multicultural identity in maintaining better relations with individuals and others and the 
reflection of this on states’ behavior. It is perhaps for this reason that the behavior of 
Oman’s foreign policy is consistent with the culture of politeness prevailed in society. 
This has made it possible for Oman to deal with its neighbors and also maintain good 
relations with Iran and GCC states (Jones, 2014). Gubash (2014), in turn, explores the 
role of Ibadism in shaping the political life in Oman. One of the major achievement of 
this book is that it provides insight about the role of Ibadism as a unifying patriotic 
reference as well as the contribution of Ibadi school in developing the political 
awareness of the society. Ibadi thought is relying on the principle of electing the Imam 
and implement the idea of consultation as a key feature that distinguishes Ibadism from 
other schools in the region. The author also discusses the prevalence of peaceful 
coexistence within the Ibadi society as well as their willingness to being independent 
and maintain their sovereignty. This approach that has been experienced by Ibadism 
explain why Oman had resisted any kind of external power influence since the ancient 
days (Gubash, 2014).  
Indeed, Oman’s foreign policy is part of a national narrative that distinguishes 
it from its neighbors (Echagüe, 2015). In his attempt to employ the concept of identity 
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in the case of Oman, Valeri (2009) argues through his book titled “Oman: Politics and 
Society in the Qaboos State that Oman's authority built its own national identity of so-
called "Renaissance" which enables the government to widen its influence and 
hegemony over the society and in turn, ensure its continuity. Valeri further argues that 
creating this identity among society helped the Sultan to freely draw his own strategy 
of Oman's foreign policy. However, he is doubtful about the ability of the Omani 
government to maintain this identity due to the succession challenges of post-Qaboos 
as well as rising domestic challenges both economically and socially. However, Valeri's 
study has failed to find a link between Oman's social identity and its real motives and 
roots. This shortcoming has been covered by Echagüe (2015) who explains that the 
roots of Oman's moderate and pragmatic foreign policy stem from its long history, 
forming a unique identity of mixed population, different languages and a mix of 
religious backgrounds. These features contributed to creating a peaceful coexistence 
and tolerance within the society and as a consequence, had been reflected to determine 
the behavior of Omani government to its neighbors and other parts of the world, which 
is based on solving the conflicts through dialogue and peaceful manners to ensure 
regional security and avoid any domestic instability, the author argues. Echagüe agrees 
with "Marc Valeri" that Oman will witness internal challenges notably in the economy, 
which may cause a slight change in Oman's foreign policy, particularly with Iran due 
to the growing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Given that there is no single study devoted to explain Oman's foreign policy 
from an identity perspective, it would be useful then to see the prevailing literature 
conducted in this area for other countries. In his attempt to show that identity plays a 
role in shaping states' foreign policy to achieve economic objectives, Badawi (2016) 
offers a valuable contribution in his dissertation about "The Role of Identities and 
  
13 
 
Interests in Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq". The study examines the 
relationship between identity and Iran's interest by addressing the factors that 
contributed to the social construction of Iran's Islamic national identity. He focuses on 
Iran's trade relations with Syria and Iraq, taking into consideration that oil supplies have 
been used by Iran to influence Syrian foreign policy during several periods in the 1980s 
of the last century. In fact, much of the greater part of the Badawi's literature focuses 
on creating an identity to facilitate Iranian economic interest and ignores clarifying the 
creation of socio-political factors in this manner. Thus, Barnett (1999) employs the 
concept of identity to provide a partial explanation for the internal dynamics that led to 
Israel's embrace of the Oslo Accords. He analyzes the Israeli identity within the 
framework of four constitutive strands: religion, nationalism, the Holocaust and 
liberalism. He states that identity should not be perceived as a psychological or 
individual construct, but rather as the relational result of social interactions between 
actors in a given setting. Barnett enriches the discussion on identity by bringing to the 
table a new phenomenon which he terms “identity conflict”. He argues that a situation 
of identity conflict arises when political actors at domestic level have alternative 
interpretations of the meanings underlying national identity, giving rise to an internal 
struggle over establishing a deeper definition of the collective self. Barnett pinpoints 
two ways in which identity informs foreign policy behavior of a state: identity conflict 
as a source of internal competitive dynamics, and identity itself as the primary source 
of national interests. 
Besides, there are also constructivist theories that explain the relation between 
ideas and foreign policy making and how states' identities shape their international 
behavior (Mansour, 2016). In his study, Mansour (2016) makes a comparative study 
between six Middle East countries namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Egypt, 
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and Syria to investigate the relation between ideas and foreign policymaking. The 
author uses constructivist theories to analyze how states' identities shape their 
international behavior. In turn, Yavuz (1998) uses the revival of neo-Ottomanism in 
Turkish politics as a case study to analyze the relationship between foreign policy and 
identity. Yavuz maintains that the interactions between domestic and external agency 
are mutual and specific to the context. In favor of a constructivist position that 
perception of national interest is a byproduct of social negotiations within the 
discourses of national identity, he rejects the neorealist view that international relations 
are shaped primarily through balances of power that emerge under the anarchical order 
of the international system. If identities, Yavuz argues, are the true bases of interest as 
Wendt (1992) claims, then the process through which national interest is constructed 
should be directly related to the politics of identity. Indeed, Yavuz's work is more than 
relevant to this study since the involvement of Islamic identity in shaping politics is a 
phenomenon hardly exclusive to Turkey.  
Having discussed the preceding literature that analyzes the impact of identity 
on building the social culture and its reflection on the behavior of states' foreign policy, 
the following will provide insight about the related literature that describes Oman’s 
foreign policy. These studies take into account the impact of history, economy, 
geography, culture, and religion on shaping its behavior and actions towards regional 
and international issues. 
2. Oman’s Foreign Policy 
Given that Oman's foreign policy is somehow unique in the region, there are 
numerous efforts exerted by scholars to analyze the real motives behind such an 
approach. The literature mostly explains the significance of Oman's rich history in 
shaping this policy; there are some disagreements on when Oman's foreign policy began 
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to take its shape. For instance, some authors believe that Oman's approach took its shape 
after 1970, others date it back to the beginning of the 20th century (Kechichian, 1995). 
A clear example that illustrates these differences is Kechichian’s study (1995). Despite 
his valuable contribution in analyzing Oman’s foreign policy, the study is limited in 
that it allocates the Sultanate’s external relations in the period (1970-1995). Therefore, 
there is somewhat an absence of analysis in the period (1930-1970) under the rule of 
Said bin Taimour, the father of the current Oman’s ruler.  
On the other hand, as an attempt to cover the shortcomings of Kechichian study, 
Al-Khalili (2009) offers a valuable and much more comprehensive insight. Al-Khalili 
believes that for a comprehensive understanding of Muscat’s foreign policy, the 
analysis should date back to 1930 particularly during the era of Said bin Taimour 
considering his role as the seeds of Oman’s foreign policy. He clarifies the internal 
political division in Oman as a consequence of competition between the Imamate and 
Al-Said dynasty in the early 20th century and the British interventions in this regard. 
Furthermore, Al-Khalili did not neglect to analyze the current Oman's foreign behavior 
and its reaction to various regional and international issues. However, Akseki (2010) 
has a different view than Kechichian and Al-Khalili with regard to analyzing Oman's 
foreign policy. He believes that regardless of the period taken to analyze the behavior 
of a certain state, examining domestic, regional and international environments and 
apply it to any period is sufficient to provide a clear understanding about the state's 
behavior. In doing so, Akseki (2010) identifies the determinants and the influence of 
each environment (domestic, regional and international) on shaping Oman's foreign 
behavior within the period (1970-2008). He finds that all three environments 
contributed to shaping Oman's foreign policy, but the level of contribution of each 
environment varies among each other according to the existing regional circumstances 
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and conflicts. Nevertheless, these prior studies have not been able to convincingly show 
the real motives behind Oman's foreign policy, given that there is fairly a complete 
absence of examining the geopolitical, religious and cultural factors.    
As stated earlier, the current Oman's independent and neutral foreign behavior 
has been shaped through the interaction of different factors throughout history. Thus, 
in order to understand and analyze its approach, it important to address the factors that 
led to shape this approach. Indeed, there are several works of literature that focus on 
addressing these factors. To begin with, Baabood (2016) argues that Oman's foreign 
policy is an interaction of social level, state level, and system level. While he examines 
the role of political culture represented by "Ibadism" thought, other factors have also 
been considered such as Oman's geographical position and its limited economic 
capability. Lefebvre (2009) agrees and further discusses in depth the dynamics and 
motives behind Oman's foreign policy in the twenty-first century. He argues that there 
are three main factors that characterize Oman's behavior: strategic location, the post-
petroleum economy and the Ibadi culture which is based on tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence. These three factors will continue to constrain and determine the orientation 
of any future leader with regard to Oman's foreign policy. 
Moreover, Oman's limited economy has also a great influence that describes 
Oman current behavior which prompted it to conduct good relations with its neighbors 
(Lefebvre, 2009). To compare the findings of Baabood (2016) and Lefebvre (2009) 
studies, AlRahma (2015) demonstrates in her dissertation that Oman's foreign policy 
has been shaped mainly by a geopolitical factor more than any other factors. She argues 
that Oman was exposed to some great powers such as the Portuguese, the British as 
well as the Persian due to its strategic location on the opening of the Arabian Gulf and 
its closeness to different international sea lines, which contributed to raise the 
  
17 
 
awareness of Omani people about the external greed and thereby, developed their 
resistance and interaction against these powers (AlRahma, 2015). Therefore, the 
geopolitical factor is the driven factor that shapes Oman’s foreign policy as AlRahma 
believes.  
Having looked at the preceding literature that discusses Oman's foreign policy 
from its wider and general view, there are also several papers that are purely focused 
on analyzing Oman's reaction within a particular issue as a case study. In general, 
Oman's interaction with the regional crisis is based on solving conflicts through 
dialogue and peaceful manners rather than aggressive or escalated actions 
(Lefebvre,2009). This peaceful foreign policy appears in two studies that demonstrate 
how Oman reacted with the regional issues.  In his study, Rabi (2005) explains Oman's 
independent approach in dealing with Camp David peace accords in 1978, unlike Arab 
consensus who cut their ties with Egypt. Oman's behavior, in this case, stems from its 
belief that Arab conflict with Israel could be solved through such agreement, nor 
through escalation and hostile actions (Rabi, 2005). Schmierer (2015), agrees and 
further provides another case study that demonstrates Oman’s interest in solving the 
conflicts peacefully with regard to the Iranian nuclear program. The author perceives 
Oman’s efforts to solve this complicated file as a reflection of its belief in defusing 
tension and conflict in the region. He illustrates that being independent and neutral in 
dealing with the regional crisis, is a helpful and a powerful tool that can be used in 
solving complex issues such as the Iranian nuclear program, and obviously a clear 
evidence that issues can be solved in a peaceful manner than military options 
(Schmierer, 2015). 
After examining the related literature of either identity or Oman's foreign policy, 
it becomes obvious that there is very limited studies devoted to analyzing Oman's 
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foreign policy from identity platform like the studies conducted for Turkey, Israel and 
Iran discussed above. Thereby, providing insights about the main factors that shape 
Oman's foreign policy and emphasizing the role of identity in this aspect, is the main 
feature that distinguishes this study from the preceding literature related to Oman's 
foreign policy. Hence, adding a platform of identity to the research area will provide a 
comprehensive understanding and up -to- date analysis of Oman’s foreign policy. 
Another fact is that despite the valuable contribution of some preceding studies that 
touch upon the motives and dynamics behind Oman’s foreign policy, the role of identity 
in creating such approach is almost neglected or relatively addressed. Hence, the 
research attempts to cover the shortcomings of the preceding literature by involving the 
role of identity, so that it will be a valuable resource for scholars of Middle East studies 
and students as it will enrich the literature conducted in Oman's case. Therefore, further 
research will fill the gap in the literature by offering a clear and in-depth assessment of 
the real motives behind Oman's foreign policy. 
The Theoretical Framework of the Study; Social Constructivism 
There are different schools of international relations theories that describe 
states’ foreign policy. Among all these different theories, this research uses social 
constructivism, one of the most prevalent theories of mainstream International 
Relations literature. In contrast with the conventions of neorealism and neoliberalism, 
social constructivism chiefly pursues to determine how ongoing processes of social 
practice and interaction can shape essential features of interactions between states, i.e. 
social construction (Adler, 1997). The ideas "that the structures of human association 
are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the 
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
than given by nature" comprise, according to Wendt (1999), the two progressively 
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recognized principal creeds of social constructivism. Based on this view, interactions 
between states are not only influenced by power politics, but also by identities. The 
fundamental structures underlying these interactions are not necessarily material, but 
rather, social (Wendt, 1999). This leads social constructivists to place heavier emphasis 
upon the notion of identity, how it feeds into the formation of interests of actors, and 
hence changes in the nature of social interaction between states (Wendt, 1999). 
There are two main reasons for choosing a constructivist framework. Firstly, 
this theory has significantly contributed to my understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the formulation of Omani foreign policy. What particularly interested me 
was the irony that even though identity directly informs perceived interests, social 
constructivism does little in favor of them in his response to past theories. What social 
constructivism does instead is identifying neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist 
claims about state behavior, in the context of international relations theory (Adler, 
1997). This is because clearing the social constructivist argument of false charges of 
earlier theories would immediately restore its explanatory potential. I call it potential 
because the social constructivist theory does not provide an explanation for practical 
matters. Rather, it is a set of principles which provide analysts with the potential to 
explain any-be it present, past, or hypothetical-situation of international relations. 
Secondly, once this is done, advocating the importance of identity in the formulation of 
foreign policy becomes irrelevant, because questioning the inherent functionality of 
foreign policy becomes irrelevant (Adler, 1997). The reason for this lies at the situation 
that whether the foreign policy of a given state in the case of this study, Oman-has a 
true promise under certain material conditions completely depends on the prevalent 
identities and interests present in a given social structure. In other words, when it comes 
to the question how one can explain the formation of Omani foreign policy within the 
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current social structure, social constructivism provides a suitable theoretical framework 
because we are living in a world of conflicting identities with conflicting interests 
(Rieger, 2013). Therefore, with regard to the case and nature of Oman, it is clearly 
obvious that the internal factors and social characteristics had a major role in 
influencing the state's foreign policy (Nonneman, 2015). Constructivism theory shows 
that each state is characterized by a distinct domestic nature resulting from different 
factors such as state's political system, economic capabilities, degree of political 
participation, religious and cultural heterogeneity, identity concepts and finally the 
history of society and the state (Rieger, 2013). The following sections provide an in-
depth description of national identity and its role in influencing states’ foreign policy. 
The Concept of State Identity 
The notion of identity has been examined through numerous scopes and 
presented in innumerable manners that mirror the methodological and theoretical 
orientations of different analysts. Some researchers approach identity as a foundational 
principle for developing constructivist theories that are commonly applied in the study 
of International Relations (Wendt, 1999; Weldes, 1996; Jepperson, Wendt, & Kat 
zenstein, 1996). Other researchers have looked into empirical analyses with particular 
causative extrapolations that concentrate on identity: how state identity impact on their 
interests (Lee, 2006; and Banchoff 2009); how changes in the national identity 
contribute to changes in state policy; and subsequently, how these changes impact on 
the international system. 
Numerous researchers have concentrated on the shared relations between 
international level actors and state identities, looking into, for instance, how the 
international environmental norms and institutions impact on state identities, how local 
notions of state identities and international norms interrelate, and if the dynamics of 
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state identities unavoidably result in conflicts. Other scholars have also addressed the 
issue of identity from multiple perspectives, which include the relations between 
political development of states and national identity conceptions, how identity is treated 
when viewed from the feminist theorist perspective, as well as how national identity is 
constructed (Dittmer & Kim, 2018; Ruane, 2006; Tickner, 2006; and Eyre & Suchman, 
1996). These and many more research analyses that center on the concept of state 
identity and its relationship to the wider study of international relations shed more light 
on the nexus and impact to the larger IR framework. 
The recent increase in research addressing the issue of identity within 
international relations raises multiple definitions of identity. It is for this reason that 
critical observers such as Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006) termed 
the resultant situation a state of “definitional anarchy.” One explanation for this 
anarchical state is typological. Within the related research, different forms of “identity” 
are found, which include “self,” “collective,” “national,” “role,” “social,” “relational,” 
“corporate,” and “personal identity.” This introduced many diverse descriptions of 
identity, such as a rational addition or prolonging of the self to incorporate the well-
being of others (collective identity), identifying one-self along state dispositions 
(national identity), and social identity – the self-concept emanating from the knowledge 
that a participant may have with regard to members within a social group (Gries, 2005; 
Mattern, 2001; and Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994). Definitions additionally vary 
based on the specific aspects that researchers choose to focus on. For instance, Abdelal 
et al. (2006) note that collective identity varies along two primary dimensions namely 
contestation and content for purposes of operationalizing the principle to conduct 
comparative evaluation across members of a group. Others such as Zehfuss & Maja 
(2002) perceive identity as an outcome of the human desire to comprehend the world. 
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Other scholars such as Checkel (2001) and Callahan (2006) have not provided an 
explicit definition of identity and have rather favored to treat it as a self-explanatory 
concept. 
Against this backdrop, it is important to begin by looking at identity in a simple 
form by adopting the definition provided by Jepperson et al. (1996). The authors define 
identity as the image of distinctiveness and individuality projected and held by an actor. 
According to the authors, identity is not just about the character or description of actors’ 
characters. Wendt (1999) explains that such self-concepts are applicable in their plural 
form, for instance, when one says ‘I am a Catholic, a Lawyer, or a Russian,’ and they 
are in many cases, although not at all times formed and conceived through an actor's 
relationship and interaction with other individuals within the environment. In light of 
this, interactions and social experiences with other individuals are important elements 
for molding as well as remodeling identity, whereas ecological factors, which include 
institutional and cultural situations that provide appropriate platforms for the 
aforementioned interactions and experiences to occur have a possibility of being 
employed for developing identities (Wendt, 1999). 
Given that the aforementioned accounts and definition of identity are derived 
from scholarly research in philosophy and psychology regarding a person's identity, it 
then follows that they should be translated within the context of a state. In this respect, 
state identities can be identified as a distinct identity category that denotes the image of 
distinctiveness and individuality projected and maintained by the states within specific 
international frameworks. In its simplistic form, state identity implies a notion of what 
a state represents (Alexandrov, 2003). Similar to individual identities, for instance, the 
concept of the Self-applied within the context of a state, is modified and developed over 
time through interactions and relations with other states, and in other instances, as a 
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result of interaction with other international actors that may include transnational and 
international firms. Meanwhile, institutional and cultural factors of states' external and 
internal environments additionally assist in developing the concept and philosophy of 
state identity. Similar to personal identity, state identity thus does not only represent an 
expressive personality of a state, but it is additionally a relational as well as the social 
concept that refers to the state in a manner that mirrors the identity or existence of others 
(Altoraifi, 2012). 
The Concept of State Identity and how it differs from National Identity 
 A clear difference between national identity and state identity is not easily made. 
Many scholars use the phrase state identity in respect to what is national identity and 
vice versa. Other scholars sub-divide identity into external and internal dimensions. The 
concepts of state and national identities, many times, if not at all times, overlay to a 
certain level. The common explanations of national identity that tie the "perceived 
community" together do additionally interrelate this community to other countries, 
while state identity, seen as common beliefs about the other and the self can become 
important factors in the role of maintaining togetherness of national society. The 
difference between state and national identities, thus, does not naturally or emanate 
from the basic distinctions between the aforementioned concepts (Bloom, 1993). To a 
certain level, this difference emanates from the divergent research priorities and 
theoretical concerns across the disciplinary areas of international relations and political 
science. Those academicians concerned with ethnic conflicts, nationalism, or domestic 
politics approach identity as "national" while those of the disciplines of international 
relations and foreign policy stress on the external perspective of identity (Altoraifi, 
2012). 
Acknowledging the ongoing need for nation building in both the developed and 
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the developing states, scholars such as Bloom (1993) have argued that the substantial 
national identity dynamic, many times, affects a country's foreign policy, therefore 
going over and above the national context and spilling over to the IR domain. The 
impending signing of national identity problematic for IR theory is additionally a 
primary consequence of an argument fronted by Ruggie (1998) regarding equivalence 
between the principles of domestic order at play in the US’s comprehension of its 
formation within the larger context of political community, and the vision of world 
order demanded by US leaders when instituting a new international system. Ruggie 
(1998) further argues that the identity factors of US played an important role in defining 
US interests on such areas as developing NATO and United Nations, and together with 
the superior capabilities of the US as hegemony had a significant effect on the 
international framework. This means that based on the principles and variables of IR 
theory, the national identity of great or hegemonic power in the world plays a critical 
role in the development of international systems.  
Analyzing State Identity through Constructivist Approaches 
Over and above the core of state identity, constructivist theorists stress on the 
margins that result from discussions that center on identity. They contend that identity 
is only present as a subject of discussion and that it is never secure or stable enough to 
become a descriptive factor in the analysis of foreign policy. Constructivists approach 
the “Self-Other” correlations in terms of opposition such that positive features are 
attributed to the self while any negative features are attributed to the “Other” (Altoraifi, 
2012). In this perspective, Zehfuss and Maja (2002) contend that the “other” could 
additionally constitute the past “self” such as was the case with regard to West Germany 
in the postwar period when it defined its identity largely by opposing Nazi Germany 
and its associated ideas. 
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The most elaborate critical constructivist approach as regards state identity is 
presented by Campbell (1992); further extending the view presented previously by 
Bloom that foreign policy may also double up as an important element applied in the 
course of nation-building. The analysis by Campbell with regard to state identity and 
particularly that of the US in relation to foreign policy leads to the traditional view of 
foreign policy as the external alignment of pre-instituted countries with safe identities. 
Consequently, the author overturns the underlying relationship between foreign policy 
and state identity. The author provides an abstract understanding of foreign policy as a 
practice that produces boundaries, which are important to the construction and 
reconstruction of state identity in whose name it functions.  
Campbell (1992) also recognizes state identity as the result of exclusion or 
elimination practices whereby elements that are resistant to securing identity from 
internally are correlated through a “dialogue of risk” with externally identified and 
located threats. Because the process of nation-building never ends, the identity and 
existence of a state cannot be safe and therefore has to be constantly maintained by the 
discourse of risk and danger. Constructivists argue that their identities form state 
interests and that owing to the process of interaction; the formed identities are 
susceptible to change. Constructivists thus argue that their methodologies can give 
better abstract accounts of change and evolution in IR as opposed to what rationalists 
provide (Alexandrov, 2003). Constructivists additionally advance the discourse that 
countries hold norms not just owing to their self-interest but also as a result of having 
internalized them within their identities, therefore widening the constrictive liberalist 
system for the scholarship of norms (Campbell, 1992). 
Many scholars view state identity as being part of the larger culture (Berger, 
1998). Constructivists define culture as socially shared or common beliefs and 
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practices. This definition of culture is narrower than and different from common sense 
or conservative meaning of the word. This difference is expected as constructivists are 
only concerned by those aspects that directly relate to IR. Therefore, for instance, the 
approach adopted by Berger (1998), in particular, makes reference to a country's local 
political-military cultural disposition, defined as “a subsection of the wider historical-
political culture that includes dispositions associated with the use of force in 
international affairs, the military as an institution, security, and defense” (P. 62). There 
is, nevertheless inconsistency among scholars in matters that relate to whether state 
identity forms part of the international or local culture. Whereas a majority of 
constructivist researchers stress on a country’s local culture as being a core source of 
state identity, some such as Wendt (1999) (Cited in Hudson, 2013) describes the culture 
of interstate society as a core factor of state identity. 
  
27 
 
CHAPTER 3: OMAN’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 
This Chapter highlights the components of national identity that have a great 
impact on shaping the current approach of Oman's foreign policy. As argued earlier in 
Chapter 1, national identity has a great influence in determining the approach of foreign 
policy that a certain state will pursue. Despite the fact that there are numerous 
components of national identity, four of them are highly influential with respect to the 
Omani case. They include its unique geographical location, the country's historical 
dimension, its cultural and civilizational heritage and the religious aspect. The 
following is an analysis of these principles and how they fit in the country's foreign 
policy setup.  
Historical Dimension 
 As it has been argued by scholars of statehood from different schools of thought, 
the conception of a state and the development of state identity is unavoidably associated 
to people's imagining or perception of their history and immemorial past. It has been 
argued that what gives nationalism its strength are ethnic heritage symbols, traditions, 
memories, and myths. Psychiatrists and social psychologists also accentuate the fact 
that a significant cognitive basis that is fundamental to the construction of social 
identity is shared knowledge regarding in-group history, in addition to the history of 
the inter-group points of contacts and conflict (Huang & Liu, 2018). As such, given that 
the collective elements of national identity include memories of national achievements, 
national experiences, national traditions and symbols, then it follows that a nation's 
history is equally important because all these collective elements are rooted in it (Huang 
& Liu, 2018). 
 With respect to Sultanate of Oman, it has had different historical experiences 
both in the distant and in the recent past. These past historical experiences are regarded 
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as one of the fundamental underpinnings of its foreign policy, for instance, the country's 
social interactions both externally and internally. As such, Oman commits a lot of 
resources to strengthen and consolidate its friendship with different people from 
multiple nations outside its national borders, who are of strategic significance to the 
country’s security and economic interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). With 
Africa and Asia, the Sultanate of Oman seeks to support common interests and 
communicate while at the same time promoting cultural and civilizational exchange. 
 Oman’s earliest settlements date from early 3 B.C. It was initially called the 
country of Majan. During this period, Oman’s main activity was smelting copper and 
this was subsequently traded to Mesopotamia (Riphenburg, 1998). The Acadian and 
Sumerian inscriptions indicate that Oman, formerly called Majan had naval relations 
with Akkad and Sumer and this relationship comprised of an extensive trading network 
that stretched to Africa, Indus Valley, and Sumer (Hourani & Carswell, 1995). As 
people continued to look for areas to mine copper, a lot of agricultural lands was 
desiccated and coupled with changes in the climatic conditions; agriculture was 
officially replaced by camel nomadism. With time, the urbanized life vanished and 
copper trade came to a halt. A lot of time passed and it took nearly 1,000 years for 
agricultural settlements to reappear. This reappearance was largely attributed to the 
Persian expansion into the Arabian Peninsula and subsequent installation of agricultural 
systems as it was traditionally practiced by Persians (Riphenburg, 1998). 
 The earliest Arab migration into Oman is said to have taken place approximately 
2,000 years ago. The Azd tribes were the first to land in Oman and they originated from 
Yemen, which was initially called Western Arabia (Akseki, 2010). Other subsequent 
migrations occurred all through the centuries while at the same time, the Persians were 
expanding their settlements in Oman. Some friction between these two groups 
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happened in the 6th century and from the resultant war, the Persians were defeated by 
Arabs and this effectively consolidated their position in the region. Having consolidated 
their position, it was only a matter of time before the introduction of Islam. This 
occurred in 630 AD (7th century Haas, 2013) after prophet Muhammad sent an envoy 
purposed to convince and convert the Omani tribes by preaching the Islamic faith. The 
Arabs accepted and as a result, more tension between the Omani tribes and the Persians 
developed given that the Persians refused to accept the Islamic religion (Ghubash, 
2014). Official consolidation took place in 632 AD in the Ridda Wars. This led to a 
mass withdrawal of the Persians from Oman and they effectively migrated to Iran 
(Akseki, 2010). 
 The emergence of Oman as a significant maritime power at the crossroads of 
trade routes of Africa particularly East Africa, the Gulf, and India occasioned the rise 
of an expanding commercial society that necessitated an understanding leader who 
understood the unique needs of this emerging society. This newly-fangled social 
structure resulted in another classification in Oman’s political and social life: the old 
policies and principles of the conservative imamate, reacting to the demands of this new 
commercial society with unique needs, and the resultant tension brought about by the 
new reality of an increasingly changing society that was inclined towards the secular 
rule. Oman was subjected to multiple invasions by foreign powers and dynasties (Al-
Khalili, 2009). For instance, Oman was under the leadership of Qarmatians between 
the years 931 and 934. Oman was also placed under the rule of the Seljuk Empire 
between 1053 and 1154. Others included the Nabhani Dynasty (1154-1470; 1600-
1624), the Portuguese (1515-1650), and the Ottomans (1550-1551; 1581-1588) 
(Akseki, 2010). 
 The Ya'aribah dynasty gained the reins of power in the year 1624 after Murshid 
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al-Ya'aribi was elected as the ruler. Murshid had contested for authority to rule Oman 
against the Portuguese for approximately 25 years and Saif al-Ya'aribi, his successor, 
had managed to drive away all the Portuguese from Oman and subsequently helped to 
complete the country’s unification (Al-Rahma, 2015). It was under this dynasty that 
Oman was able to expand its power all through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region 
towards the end of the 17th century, effectively becoming one of the major powers 
(Lefebvre, 2010). The Ya’aribah Dynasty was able to change a lot of things in Oman; 
key among them was the introduction of hereditary succession, which contravened the 
Ibadhi doctrine. The introduction of this rule generated another dividing line in Oman’s 
political life and this resulted in a tribal war that lasted for approximately 20 years (Al-
Khalili, 2009). 
 The country experienced political instabilities again after Sultan ibn Saif II left 
a power vacuum after his demise. His two sons fought a protracted war that lasted for 
many years. This aggression culminated into a full-blown civil war in 1723 after the 
Hinawi and Ghafiri groupings joined the conflict each in the opposing side (Al-Khalili, 
2009). These instabilities in the social and political environment that originated from 
the struggle between the two warring sides: the struggle between Ulama and the tribes, 
which also included territorial conflicts and family rivalry, generated a convenient 
chance for external powers to take advantage of the situation and invade Oman. This 
was the case in 1738 when the Persians invaded Oman (Halliday, 1996). The Al Said 
Dynasty rose to power led by Ahmad bin Said in 1744. This ruling Dynasty continuous 
to rule the country to this day, whereby the current Sultan (Qaboos bin Said) is the ruler 
number 12 of the Al Said Dynasty (Kechichian,1995). This fact sets the Al Said 
Dynasty as one of the oldest in the world. So, Ahmad bin Said resistance to the Persian 
rule made him prominent and he garnered overwhelming support from the two warring 
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sides. He soon was able to drive the Persians away and expelled them completely from 
Oman. He, however, inherited a state that had been devastated by constant Persian 
invasion and civil war (Al-Rahma, 2015). 
 Ahmad bin Said was able to consolidate power and during his rule, Oman 
expanded its commercial and military influence in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean coastal 
region, and East Africa in late 18th and early 19th centuries (Akseki, 2010). It is through 
this consolidation that Oman was able to become a maritime power extending to 
Zanzibar in East Africa and the coast of modern-day Pakistan. Traders and 
entrepreneurs from Oman played a critical role in developing commercial routes all 
through these regions following the earlier established trade networks (Bhacker, 2002). 
His rule was characterized by concentrating on the restoration of the devastated 
overseas regions by investing in both the external and domestic fronts. Ahmad bin Said 
was able to suppress the tribal opposition within the country and he also rebuilt the 
collapsed irrigations systems, effectively transforming Oman to become one of the 
major foods producing states. Surplus food was used in trade and this helped to restore 
the Omani hegemony in the region and in the areas that it had been able to conquer 
(Akseki, 2010). 
 In the early stages of the 19th century (1806-1856), under the leadership of Said 
bin Sultan, Oman persistently consolidated its control and extended its influence in the 
East Africa region and the Gulf area. Said sent a governor to the East African island of 
Zanzibar and he also put pressure on Omani tribes in the Gulf, effectively challenging 
their power that culminated in losing some strategic areas. In 1830, Said had already 
conquered the Swahili coast and he took from Zanzibar as a capital of his great empire. 
It was during this time that the Omani empire had reached its peak (Kechichian, 1995). 
The following figures show two old maps of Oman that has been taken from the London 
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Geographical Institute and shown in the National Records and Archives Authority in 
Oman. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The map of Oman under the era of Said bin Sultan (The London Geographical 
Institute) 
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Figure 2: Another map of Oman shown in London Geographical Institute 
 
 
 It is worth mentioning that Oman’s relation with the great powers had flourished 
during the rule of Said bin Sultan. He extended friendly relationships with these powers, 
particularly the US, UK, France, Germany and Iran. He exchanged friendly letters with 
these countries and most significantly, he appointed the first Arab ambassador to 
Washington namely “Ahmed bin Nuaman Al Kaabi (Kechichian, 1995). The letter 
shown in figure 3 is one of the letters he exchanged with the UK among other letters 
and documents shown in the Appendix page.  
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Figure 3: Friendship letter from Said bin Sultan to the President of Bremen city 
 
 
 Nevertheless, after Said’s rule, there were internal instabilities and unrests, 
economic challenges and the ever increasing threat of foreign presence. British 
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interference had widened during the reign of Faisal ibn Turki to the point that angered 
the internal and conservative Ibadi tribes (Al-Khalili, 2009). Internal struggles had 
prompted him to seek the help of France and Britain to regain Muscat, which he had 
lost to the tribes. Given that Britain had already become a major trading partner with 
Oman, his decision to sign a pact with France granting them with coaling facilities for 
their fleet angered Britain, which required him to board a British naval vessel in Muscat 
Harbor, failure to which Muscat would be reduced to rubbles (Kechichian, 1995). He 
boarded and soon rescinded his offer to France. Although his actions halted the 
aggression of the British, in the eyes of the Omani’s, he was finished politically and his 
authority permanently damaged (Al-Rahma, 2015). It is worth noting that both France 
and Britain viewed Oman as a country that holds a strategic location where they could 
extend their influence in the region. Because of that, there was competition between 
France and UK to strengthening their ties with Oman. For instance, France issued a 
royal decree of appointing a Consul in Muscat in 1749 (Figure 4). Moreover, France 
exchanged some of the friendly letters with the Omani authority as shown in Figure 5. 
This competition continued until the late 19th century when they signed a declaration 
document on respect for the leverage of the Sultans of Oman (Figure 6). 
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Figure 4: France decree of appointing a Consul to Muscat in 1749 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Letter in Arabic from Felix Francois Faure, President of France to Sultan 
Faisal bin Turki, informing the Sultan of his election as President in 1895. 
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Figure 6: a Declaration between the United Kingdom and France on respect for the 
clout or leverage of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar in 1863.  
 
 
 Nevertheless, even after this declaration, Britain intensified its relation with 
Oman in contrast to France. British involvement and interference with Oman’s internal 
affairs resulted in increased unhappiness, which generated more internal unrest and 
revolts. Although Britain was providing some support to Oman’s Sultan throne, it was 
not enough. As such, the internal political atmosphere was uncertain and quite unstable. 
The tribes were not happy with the increased British influence and the relationships of 
the British and the Sultan. This animosity brew for quite some time until 1913 when 
the Ghafiri and the Hinawi tribal groupings raised their arms against the sultan and his 
leadership as Imam (Gubash, 2014). This led to more British interference in a bid to 
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save the Sultan from being dethroned (Townsend, 1977). To do this, Britain sent troops 
to Muscat from India, which helped to avert the tribal forces from capturing Muscat. 
Britain would subsequently protect the central government in the Sultanate that had 
come under increased attacks from the tribes. The situation was untenable and 
unsustainable and as such, Britain organized for a peace deal between the chiefs and 
the central government, which culminated into the signing of the Treaty of Seeb in 1920 
(Al-Rahma, 2015). The treaty granted the Ibadi tribes to govern the interior regions 
when the Al Said ruling family took over the coastline areas. It is by this treaty and 
conflict, the country was known as Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (Akseki, 2010). 
 Sultan Taimur’s (1932-1970) reign entered the political scene and took over the 
management of the country’s affairs with support from Britain. He depended on Britain 
for support during his encounter with Imam Ghalib in 1955 (Al-Khalili, 2009). He also 
assisted the RAF (Royal Air Force) in the course of WWII. Internal conflicts would 
also characterize his leadership and he tried to isolate Oman from the modern world. 
As such, he restricted some rights and freedoms such as the right to education and 
freedom of movement. During the 1950s, Sultan Taimur experienced the same internal 
strife that had characterized the history of Oman as a result of his despotic rule and 
external interference from Saudi Arabia given that it directly funded opposition groups 
to cause havoc within Oman (Akseki, 2010). A number of encounters between the 
office of Imam and the Sultan together with external players such as Britain and Iran-
funded rebels all contributed to the situation of instability in Oman up until the 1970s 
(Lefebvre, 2009). 
Geographical Location 
One of the most important drivers of a country's foreign policy is its 
geographical location. Among other factors, a country’s geographical location has been 
  
39 
 
singled out as one of the most important components that also impact on state identity. 
It has been argued that from the early times of human history, geography has played a 
critical role in the lives of individuals (Jafari, 2012). The lifestyle that people adopt is 
shaped by geography. Equally, human relationships, nutrition, economic activities, and 
the professions that they choose are all under the influence of geography. It therefore 
occurs that geography is also vital in molding the identities of not only individuals but 
states as well. As such, there is a direct correlation between the formation of identity 
and geography. People develop their personal, group, or state identities consistent with 
the climate and conditions of the region that they live in. The perception of life, values, 
norms, and expectations are all molded by their geographical placement. Equally, the 
formation of human settlements and communities, which plays a critical role in the 
development of social memory is also affected by geographical placement. Geography 
has therefore traditionally played a critical role particularly with regard to colonization 
(Lefebvre, 2009). Owing to their geographical placement, some countries are more 
prone to external attacks than others. This was the case with Oman as its location acted 
as an important factor in welcoming external aggression from the Persians, British, the 
Portuguese, as well as other foreign states (Kechichian, 2007). 
Oman covers a total land area of about 309,000 km2 and is located in the 
Southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula . The land area in Oman comprises various 
topographic features, which include coastal plains at 3%, mountain ranges at 15%, and 
land mass, which accounts for 82% of the country (Jafari, 2012). Oman is flanked by 
the empty quarter of Saudi Arabia (Rub' al Khali), the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of 
Oman, all of which contribute immensely to the country's geographical isolation 
(Wilkinson, 1964). All through history, Oman’s contacts with other countries from 
different parts of the world were primarily by sea, which not only linked the coastal 
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towns but also provided access to foreign lands. Even with sophisticated desert 
transport, the Rub al Khali is a challenge to cross. It effectively formed a barrier 
between the Arabian interior and the Sultanate of Oman with another barrier being 
formed by the Al Hajar Mountains. These two major barriers have maintained the 
country’s sovereignty by discouraging any external military encroachments (Jafari, 
2012). 
Oman holds a strategically significant position given it sits at the entry of the 
Persian Gulf (Lefebvre, 2009). It shares marine borders with Pakistan and Iran and 
shares land borders with Yemen to the southwest, Saudi Arabia to the west, and the 
northwest, United Arab Emirates. It is surrounded by two water bodies from both sides 
of its borders. To the south-east is the Indian Ocean and to the east is the Arabian Sea. 
To the northeast is the Oman Sea (AlRahma, 2015). Oman is separated from Iran, one 
of its long-time adversaries, by the Strait of Hormuz, which by extension means that 
the two countries share a maritime border (Rodrigue, 2004). The Strait has a great 
strategic and economic significance. As aforementioned, there are three countries that 
border Oman, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oman’s 
geographical location is of great significance particularly with regards to connecting 
the Sultanate of Oman with other states that overlook the Indian Ocean and the Arabian 
Sea, which further impacts how the country approaches its foreign policy and how it 
relates with both the neighboring and non-neighboring countries (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2013). Of particular importance is how the country approaches matters of 
security given its geographical location for the freedom of transit and safety of 
navigation are of great importance, which if threatened could destabilize the region's 
and the country’s internal security.  
The Strait of Hormuz is an important path that connects the Persian Gulf with 
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the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. This path is significant because it is the main 
artery for the transport of products from and into the Middle East and because it is a 
geographic chokepoint (Rodrigue, 2004). Oman and Iran are the only two states nearest 
to the channel and as such, they share territorial rights over the region. Owing to its 
significance, Iran has on numerous occasioned threatened to shut down the channel. 
For instance, during the 1980s in the course of the Iran-Iraq war, a disruption of the 
shipping by Iraq prompted Iran to threaten with the closure of the strait following the 
dispute (Lefebvre, 2010). Similarly, Iran and the US Navy had a protracted battle in the 
strait in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war (Talmadge, 2008). 
One of the primary and continuous factors in the Oman-Iran relationship is the 
geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz. Oman and Iran are respectively located on the south 
and north coasts of the Strait of Hormuz. This geographical placement assists them to 
uphold good neighborly relations irrespective of what happens at the international or 
regional levels. Oman and Iran assume that there is a close correlation between their 
own security and the security at the Strait of Hormuz (Lefebvre, 2010). This factor 
reinforces their motivation to forge a friendly and close correlation. The two states are 
conscious to the fact that it is not easy to change geographical factors and that they have 
to be in contact for their interests. The two countries’ geographical proximity through 
the Strait of Hormuz, the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Strait, and 
the relative remoteness of Oman with regards to its relationship with the rest of the Gulf 
countries have mandated that Oman and Iran maintain a strong and good neighborly 
relationship with each other. In light of this and in spite of the fact that Oman has 
maintained a close relationship with some western allies, owing to the geographical 
proximity that is aided by the Strait, the two countries, Oman and Iran, have maintained 
a close relationship over the years (Jafari, 2012). 
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Cultural and Civilizational Heritage 
 According to the information mentioned on the website of foreign affairs’ 
ministry, the Sultanate of Oman is an active member of the GCC and is proud of its 
affiliation with the Arab Gulf region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Consequently, 
it is also a member of the League of Arab States. As such, it participates in various 
cultural activities within the region in collaboration with its neighbors in the expression 
of its internal and regional strategic visions in different areas that pertain to matters that 
affect the Arab nation, particularly the contentious issue surrounding Israel and 
Palestine and the lack of peace in the Middle East countries such as Yemen and Syria. 
Oman has in the past advocated for the restoration of the full rights of the Palestine 
people and has constantly tried to create peaceful options to bring to an end the many 
years of in-fighting between Arabs and Jews in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. 
Furthermore, Oman prides itself on abiding by its unique Islamic identity that impacts 
heavily on its internal and foreign policy, which is founded on tolerance and moderation 
in its cultural and civilizational exchange (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). As such, 
Oman commits a lot of resources to promote peace and love among all people and 
nations within the region and has constantly and openly condemned acts of violence, 
terrorism, and extremism. (Baabood, 2017) 
For a long time, Oman has promoted quiet diplomacy. A significant feature of 
Omani culture is the philosophy of politeness. In support of this ideology of politeness, 
scholars such as Frederick Barth have contended that in Oman, it is normal for an 
individual to model his or her behavior consistent with a code of honor and limit the 
expression of public opinion regarding an individual's worth, articulated in judgments 
of either admiration or denigration (Barth, 1983). It is based on this level of civility, 
combined with the standard diplomatic freedom of choice that supports the assertions 
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of Yusuf bin Alawi, Oman's Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the discourse of the part 
played by Oman in the period before the historic Geneva talks that calmed tensions 
between Iran and the US had been blown out of proportion. Going by the cultural norm 
of politeness, Oman’s initial comment was always going to be watered down 
significantly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The culture of politeness can also be seen in the country's active cultural 
diplomacy be it mounting exhibitions or funding professorships both in the west and in 
the east (Echague, 2015). Such undertakings are, many times, said to be intended 
purposefully to promote cultural exchange, education, and scholarship. A number of 
features of the Omani foreign policy have remained consistent with this philosophy and 
culture of politeness. Over and above this principle, Oman works and accepts the 
fundamental geopolitical realism. This can be seen in the country's policy and attitudes 
towards Iran (Jones, 2014). The country also approaches matters practically particularly 
those regarding the geopolitics of the region. It is for this reason that Oman has 
maintained a close relationship with America. 
There is also a culture of aversion to ideological or sectarian conflict. Oman is 
unique given that in the Arabian Peninsula, there are two main groups of Muslims: 
either belonging to Sunni or Shia sect. Nevertheless, a majority of people in Oman 
belong to the Ibadhi school of Islam, which originated in Basra, Iraq. Ibadhism, above 
all things, is characterized by non-sectarianism. Ibadhi Muslims can worship in any 
mosque and do welcome Muslims from the other groups to worship together (Ghubash, 
2014) (The role of Ibadhism will be discussed in details in a separate section). 
Within Oman, there is also a culture of tolerance. History indicates that when 
Oman was a great empire in the mid of 19th to which its influence extended to East 
African coast,  maritime trade had flourished. For a long time, it engaged in trade 
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between the East African coast and India (Almezaini & Rickli, 2016). A critical look at 
the trade practices also indicates that the Omanis passed through many territories, as 
well as across the Straits of Hormuz to Persia and all the way to Indonesia, to Cape 
Town passing through the Malacca Strait devoid of losing sight of land. This expansion 
helped Omani traders to export goods and other materials to other parts of the world 
(Bontebal, 2015). The growth of trade and other commercial activities had coincided 
with the flow of people from numerous ethnic and tribal origins all the way to Oman. 
By the time, these people had taken from Oman as a place of residence and had lived 
there for generations which in turn, had created a sort of unprecedented shape of multi-
culturalism that is rarely found in its neighbors (Kechichian, 2007).  
The visitor to Oman today can easily recognize this unique form of multi-
culturalism prevailed in society, which in turn, led to spreading the values of tolerance, 
acceptance others and peaceful coexistence among people. For instance, this is very 
obvious in Mutrah neighborhood in Muscat. In a study conducted by Peterson (2004), 
it has been found that due to Mutrah significance as a trade hub as well as its unique 
location, it had attracted a various types of outside population groups. During the 20th 
century, Peterson (2004) further estimates that along with the original population of 
Omani tribes, there was a homogeneous composition of various ethnic and cultural 
groups. These include Baluch and Jadjal tribes who are originally from Pakistan and 
Iran, people of sub-Saharan African descent, as well as wide varieties of Persian 
families known as Al Lawati and Al Baharinah. It has been found that around fourteen 
languages could be heard around Muscat in the early 20th century, making Oman the 
most diverse society in the Gulf (Potter, 2017). It is worth noting that currently, there 
are some commonly spoken languages in Muscat such as; Swahili, Zadjali, Baluchi, 
Lawati and of course Arabic (Bontebal, 2015).  
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 Scholars have contended that given the available archaeological evidence, it is 
possible that since the age of civilization, Omanis have been engaged in this practice 
for many years (Peterson, 2004). As such, it can be deduced that Oman has engaged in 
the culture of tolerance be it in cultural, ethnicity, or religious matters, having interacted 
with people of different religions, cultures, and ethnicities without any aggression on 
their part. Although predominantly Muslim, Muscat has hosted a number of Christian 
churches and Jewish synagogues without having any religious conflict (Baabood, 
2016). Thereby, and as stated in the website of the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Oman, 
it could be concluded that the principles of tolerance and peaceful coexistence pursued 
by current Oman’s foreign policy is mainly driven and affected by the aforementioned 
cultural values practiced by the society throughout history (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2013). This argument is also agreed by some scholars such as those conducted by 
Peterson, (2016) and Al-Khalili, (2009). 
Religious Aspect 
In 630 AD, Prophet Mohammed sent emissaries to Oman to convert Omani 
tribes into Islam. He specifically sent Amr ibn al-Ass, who was welcomed by the chiefs 
of the tribes and the country subsequently became among the first to accept the new 
faith (Gubash, 2014). This occurred in the 8th century and the Omanis adopted the Ibadi 
doctrine of Islam. The category of Ibadhism that prevailed in Oman was fashioned by 
numerous religious personalities, which included Abd Allah ibn Ibadh from whom the 
sect’s name was derived (Eickelman, 2002). One unique characteristic of Ibadhism is 
the process of selecting a leader or a ruler (Imam). Unlike in other regions, Ibadhis 
select their leaders through communal consent and consensus. There is no lineage or 
other factors such as familial affiliations that impact on the selection process. Provided 
an individual is qualified and worthy of the position, ancestry does not play any role in 
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the selection process (Kechichian, 2007). 
Another significant feature of Ibadhism is the principle of consultative 
participation or Shura. Ibadhism stipulates that the Imam must at all times rule with the 
consent and advice of their people. Where the popularity of the imam has reduced 
significantly, he may be deposed or removed from office by a popular vote and his seat 
declared vacant (Kechichian, 2007). Where there is no suitable candidate to replace 
him, the office of Imam may remain vacant until such a time when a suitable candidate 
is found for replacement. Oman is the only Islamic country within the Gulf region that 
has most of its population adopting Ibadhi Islamic beliefs and practices. The first Imam 
was elected in Oman in 749 after the unification. During this time, the Imam was both 
a political and religious leader, who was elected by the Ulama through a lengthy and 
rigorous process of vetting and consultations (Ghubash, 2014). The only viable and 
valid political organization of the time, the Imamate, had retained its power up until the 
reign of Ya’aribah. It was during this period that the principle of hereditary succession 
was done away with, a feature which had stood for many years within the Imamate. 
This enabled many different leaders to ascent to power in subsequent years 
(Kechichian, 2007). 
This unique experience of Ibadhi governance which was based on the principle 
of consultative had a profound impact on shaping Oman’s national identity and the 
political system in particular. This impact has continued to the present day, whereby 
the current ruler (Qaboos bin Said) is one of the heirs of this Ibadi political experiment. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the political stability that Oman enjoys in the current 
time might be due to the long period of ruling and political experience of this Dynasty. 
Arguably, one of the explanations behind the current independent foreign policy of 
Oman is referred to one of the characteristics of Ibadhi school of thought which is the 
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rejection of being subordinated or influenced by the central Islamic state particularly 
during the era of Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman (Al-Khalili, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 4: OMAN’S FOREIGN POLICY, THE PRINCIPLES AND DECISION-
MAKING SYSTEM 
Numerous principles characterize Oman's foreign policy and this Chapter will 
highlight them extensively. In addition, the Chapter addresses the influence of the 
Sultan Qaboos in how these policies are formulated and applied. The Chapter also 
examines how decision-making process is being operated with regard to Oman’s 
foreign policy. 
The Main Principles that Characterize Oman’s Foreign Policy 
Since 1970, some of the main objectives of Oman’s foreign policy have been to 
gain international and regional recognition, attracting international investments, 
establishing friendly relations with its neighbors and international partners, 
safeguarding of its territories from wars and foreign intervention, as well as protecting 
its sovereignty. In retrospect, it is clear that Sultan Qaboos has been able to achieve a 
majority of these objectives. Just after a short while of his rule, Oman has gained 
international recognition and has succeeded to be a unified state under the name 
“Sultanate of Oman” after for very long being known as “Sultanate Muscat and Oman” 
due to the division and conflict between the interior tribes and the Al Said authority 
(Lefebvre, 2010). In a bid to promote regional peace and safeguarding its sovereignty 
while avoiding wars and external aggression, Oman joined the Arab League in 1971, 
and towards the end of the same year became a member of the United Nations. Oman 
has also been able to make its national decisions and create its national foreign policy 
without undue influence from international or regional powers. It has also largely been 
able to safeguard not only its national borders but has also participated extensively in 
bringing peace to the Gulf region through various direct engagement peace initiatives 
(Miller, 1997). Although many different factors contribute and participate in Oman’s 
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foreign policy practice, there are a number of basic underlying principles that typify 
their application. The following is an analysis of these principles as has been observed 
in the past few decades. 
1. Neutrality 
Oman has always maintained the principle of remaining neutral and keeping a 
distance from any form of polarization. Its neutrality is evident in the way it deals with 
different entities devoid of creating hostilities or enmity and maintaining these 
relationships on the basis of mutual respect. This policy of remaining neutral has seen 
Oman make friends with different countries that consider each other enemies, for 
instance, it has maintained a very good relationship with the United States and similarly 
its neighbor Iran, a longtime adversary of the United States (Al Mahrami, 2014). At the 
same time, Oman has been able to maintain a cordial relationship with Pakistan and 
India despite these two countries having a history of protracted border conflict that 
threatened to degenerate into a nuclear war. Similarly, Oman has maintained a good 
and effective role in its efforts to solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue, to an extent that 
on numerous occasions, it has spearheaded peace talks between these two warring sides, 
the last was in October 2018 when Sultan Qaboos received both Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmood Abbas in Muscat (Sanchez, 2018).  
2. Balanced Relationships 
Oman’s foreign policy is grounded on the concept of mutual benefits between 
itself and other states. This principle has seen Oman create balanced relationships with 
other different countries, focusing on developing and enhancing common interests. In 
doing this, Oman has ensured that it safeguards its sovereignty and decisions 
irrespective of whether other countries are in support or not. Over the years, there has 
been a lot of activities that center on Oman’s principle of maintaining balanced 
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relationships between itself and other entities. For example, it has had a good 
relationship with Iran and maintained a balanced relationship with the two countries 
sharing a maritime border at the Strait of Hormuz. Despite Iran being considered a 
hostile state by Oman’s regional partners in the Gulf, Oman has not been deterred from 
maintaining a cordial and balanced relationship (Rieger, 2013). 
3. Peaceful Coexistence 
For the observer, it is not an exaggeration to find out that there is no other 
country in the Gulf region known for its policy of promoting peaceful coexistence and 
non-intervention in other states domestic affairs than Oman. Peace and solving conflicts 
through dialogue is one of the fundamental principles that characterize its foreign 
policy. This principle also distinguishes it from the other countries in the Arabian Gulf. 
Over the years, Oman has always advocated for peace through dialogue and non-
aggression approach in solving regional and international issues (Valeri, 2009). At the 
forefront of advocating peace has been Sultan Qaboos championing peaceful 
coexistence between warring states. For example, in 1978, Sultan Qaboos spearheaded 
talks between Israel and Egypt and has always advocated and supported peace talks 
between Israel and Palestine.  
Qaboos also supported and facilitated peace talks between Iran and the United 
States particularly on the contentious issue of the nuclear program while he has also 
participated extensively in organizing peaceful resolutions in Lebanon. Very recently, 
Oman has participated in peace talks to end the conflict in Yemen while with regard to 
Syria, Oman is still advocating for a peaceful resolution, calling on the two sides to 
resolve peacefully. It is clear that this forms the bedrock of the country's foreign policy. 
4. Non-Interference 
Consistent with the policy of remaining neutral, Oman has avoided interfering 
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with internal affairs of other countries. This has been one of its main principles that 
have supported its international relations policy. On numerous occasions, Oman has 
distanced itself from internal instabilities or issues of its neighbors and international 
partners, refusing to get drawn into unnecessary conflicts that may breed hostility. This 
was quite evident during the 2011 Arab Spring events. When other Gulf states were 
taking sides during the uprising in Egypt, Oman preferred to remain neutral, choosing 
to stay clear of any internal political activities that affected the internal security of its 
ally (Al Mahrami, 2014). This policy has also helped Oman to avoid making 
unnecessary enemies. It has always remained pragmatic when dealing with 
international partners. 
5. Active Membership in International Conventions and Laws 
Oman is a member of the United Nations and participates in most if not all state 
activities that are associated with the organization. The Sultanate of Oman gives priority 
to observing the rule of law both locally and internationally and respects international 
conventions and legal statutes. It additionally provides support to peaceful efforts 
promoted by the UN particularly those that deal with bringing peace to warring states. 
Oman also heavily supports dialogue and creates opportunities for different states to 
negotiate where conflict is widespread. For instance, although not officially stated, 
Oman played a critical role in bringing Iran and the US to the negotiation table which 
ended up into a historic peace deal between the two countries that led to the US lifting 
sanctions on Iran and subsequently, Iran halting its nuclear ambitions that would have 
destabilized peaceful coexistence of different states within the region (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013). Oman believes that the safeguard of security and the realization 
of peace at both the international and regional level is an important aspect about 
preserving the peace both internally and regionally and as such, it commits a lot of 
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resources to achieve this peaceful coexistence between itself and the rest of the world. 
The Personal Attributes of Sultan Qaboos in Drafting the Foreign Policy 
After highlighting the aforementioned principles that characterize Oman’s 
foreign policy, it is worth shedding light on the role of Oman’s leader in drafting such 
principles. The success of Oman’s foreign policy is largely attributed to the personal 
contribution of his Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said. Scholars argue that he has played 
a critical role in the formulation of the country's foreign policy and more so its success 
in promoting the country's domestic and regional interests. Qaboos's vision at the 
international and domestic level forms a key building block that promotes and one that 
has helped Oman to become the modern state it is today, particularly in the post-1970 
renaissance. He constantly seeks new opportunities to establish diplomatic relationships 
with foreign countries in different parts of the world irrespective of race, color, religion, 
or cultural affiliation. Qaboos is said to have great leadership qualities, features that 
enable him to promote peace not only in Oman but also in the region (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013). His open government policy has strengthened the country's 
internal institutions and governance, effectively making the citizens trust his leadership 
and participate fully in promoting and supporting local programs. His policies have also 
enjoyed the full support of the people in Oman and have earned him sufficient abilities 
to impact and attain impressive development results internally. 
The Sultan has played a critical role in the development of the country's foreign 
policy. Scholars have noted that what is consistently evident in his strategy is the policy 
of pragmatism (Jones, 2014). He approaches the subject of international relations with 
a lot of caution ensuring that he has not overestimated or underestimated foreign 
countries’ intentions towards Oman, as well as the country’s capabilities. The Sultan 
has also made former enemies become friends and partners in both trade and security 
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matters, which further mirrors his approach to the subject of foreign policy. He has also 
indicated that he is not afraid to make unpopular decisions in promoting peace within 
the region and with regard to supporting the domestic interests of Oman (Al-Khalili, 
2009). 
Operating from the foreign policy perspective of adherence to nonaligned 
policy, respect for international law, and noninterference in other states’ affairs, Qaboos 
has supported and promoted peaceful resolution and compromise, encouraging other 
states that are involved in the conflict to engage with peaceful dialogue and accept find 
commonalities. Since he took power from his predecessor, Qaboos has shown this 
characteristic. He is always keen on maintaining diplomatic relations between Oman 
and other states, attempting to maintain the best terms possible that would benefit all 
parties involved. Keeping in mind Oman’s strategic Middle East location, economy, 
diverse population, geography and historical account, Qaboos seeks solutions to 
challenges facing the country in the larger arena by adopting long-term perspectives in 
the pursuit of the most appropriate solutions (Valeri, 2009). 
When Sultan Qaboos assumed power in 1970, his predecessor who was also his 
father Sultan Said bin Taimur had traditionally depended on India and England for 
international support, effectively avoiding links to the country’s Arab neighbors. 
Nevertheless, when he took the reins of power, Qaboos reversed this and his idea was 
for Oman to become a regional power, and he did this by first establishing direct 
diplomatic relations with the Arab neighbors and other countries within the region and 
in far off lands (Valeri, 2009). He additionally did this by lobbying to join the United 
Nations in 1971 and equally lobbying to be accepted into the Arab League within the 
same year. In so doing, he brought to a halt the country's long-term international 
isolation and effectively placing Oman strategically with the global map. This move 
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also helped to cement the country’s sovereignty, effectively mitigating its over-
dependence on India and Britain as it’s only two strongest allies. Britain, in particular, 
supported Qaboos in overcoming the bloodless coup that had been launched against his 
father (Echague, 2015).  
In the same spirit, Qaboos made significant strides in reviving a cross-border 
relationship with the long-time hostile neighbor, Iran. The latter had first asserted its 
hegemonic powers in the region by annexing two islands that belonged to the UAE. 
During this time, Oman was recovering from the decades-long internal instabilities and 
therefore did not have sufficient resources to solve the regional challenges that had 
engulfed the region. Taking note of Shah’s regional power, the new Omani leader 
Qaboos was able to obtain Iranian military support to help overcome the Dhofar 
Rebellion (Ladwig III, 2008). Iran provided this support so needed by Oman and this 
became the first step in reinstituting diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 
addition, Qaboos was able to obtain an agreement between Iran and his country with 
regard to maintaining peace and freedom to use the Straits of Hormuz. Qaboos was also 
able to secure among other things the stature associated with being treated as a 
significant other by the most powerful state within the region, as well as an essential 
aid in the form of military intervention in the country, and a cross-border agreement 
that saw the two countries re-engage directly in trade and commerce. In return, Qaboos 
offered the Shah the needed support and cooperation, which the two countries have 
maintained up until today (Kéchichian, 2008). 
The civil unrest that had characterized the Dhofar War in Oman prompted 
Qaboos to request assistance from the other neighboring states (Peterson, 2007). By 
requesting and being offered help, Oman was able to solidify the severed ties between 
these countries and in particular, the Gulf States. Most preferred to provide assistance 
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in the form of financial aid as opposed to direct military intervention. These 
relationships did not hinder Qaboos to practice his pragmatic policy of promoting peace 
when he independently garnered public support for Egypt and in particular, President 
Sadat who played a critical role in the US-sponsored peace talks at Camp David that 
were aimed at bringing peace in the Middle East and more specifically the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in 1977. Most Arab countries did not support this move and Oman 
was the only state that stood by Egypt as the others broke off diplomatic relations with 
Egypt (Reinhart, 2011). In addition, while the other Gulf States were condemning Egypt 
in the Baghdad Rejectionist Summit in 1978, Oman chose to remain behind and this 
did not go down well with the Gulf States. But Oman’s action, spearheaded by Qaboos 
was in keeping with the country’s culture of being pragmatic. 
Between 1981 and 1985, Iraq and Iran, two of the biggest regional countries 
were engaged in a protracted conflict. That conflict together with other tensions brought 
about by different factors in the area ultimately resulted in the culmination of efforts by 
Qaboos to assist form a regional organization, which gave rise to the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. Approximately six countries came together and formed the GCC, which 
effectively became an effective regional organization within the Arabian Peninsula 
(Haas, 2013). It became an important formation particularly with regard to the safety 
and security of the region as the countries were participating in joint military drills. 
Although taking part in all regional security undertakings having consented to the 
group’s policies, Qaboos took no sides in the developing regional conflicts, for instance, 
between Israel and Palestine, Iraq and Iran and he supported neither Iraq nor Iran in the 
Iraq-Iran war. Consequently, Qaboos was able to maintain good regional relationships 
with the two powerhouses. Qaboos also participated directly in the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace talks and although this move was not popular among the GCC nations, it made a 
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lot of sense when viewed from the perspective of the long-term security situation in the 
region. 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Government Apparatus in Oman 
The underlying framework of how the Sultanate of Oman operates is anchored 
in the country's “Basic Law” which also serves as the Constitution of the country, and 
from which Sultan Qaboos derives his power. Realistically, and according to this law, 
the Sultan serves as Head of State and among other responsibilities, he is the final and 
supreme authority of Oman (AL Mahrami, 2014). Additionally, he holds other positions 
such as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Defense, the 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also holds the position of the 
country’s Prime Minister among other responsibilities. He is the only figurehead that 
has the authority to appoint Senior Judges, Ministers, Ministry Agents, and Deputy 
Prime Ministers (Lefebvre, 2010). As such, he plays a critical role in the country's 
foreign policy. Sultan Qaboos rules with the help of his appointed ministers. Since he 
rose to power, Qaboos has maintained an appropriate balance in the country in regard 
to ethnic, regional, and tribal interests in the formation of the country’s national 
administration (Mechantaf, 2010). 
 The Council of Ministers, also operates as a cabinet, occupies the second degree 
of importance in the decision-making system in Oman. There are about 31 ministers 
with about 29 ministries, eight of them are members of the Al-Said ruling family while 
others from ordinary Omani people. The Cabinet, as stipulated in the Basic Law of the 
State, assists the Sultan in drafting and implementing the general policy of the State 
(Mechantaf, 2010). In addition to the Cabinet, there are several effective security and 
administrative councils in the making of public policies. These include the Council of 
Defense, National Security Council, Council of Finance and Energy Resources, 
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Supreme Judicial Council and Governors Council along with a group of high 
committees and subcommittees. In addition to several personalities in senior 
consultative positions, such as the position of adviser of the State, or the special adviser 
to the Sultan. 
It is worth mentioning that Oman does not have political parties and the country 
does not have an independent legislature. The Council of Oman, also operates as a 
parliament, is composed of Consultative Council (elected lower chamber) and State 
Council (appointed higher chamber). The Sultan introduced a Consultative Council in 
the year 1991 and consists of 84 members. It assists the government in streamlining the 
decision-making process. Whereas the State Council was established in 1997 and the 
members are appointed by Sultan Qaboos, representing the prominent figures of the 
society, such as former government officials, academics, experts as well as tribal and 
commercial elites. The parliament can comment on and review proposed laws but they 
do not have any veto powers such that it is impossible to initiate or play any significant 
role in the country’s leadership. The parliament, therefore, only serves the role of a 
consultative body (AL Mahrami, 2014). 
Within this vast and complex network of institutions, bodies and councils, it is 
very difficult for the researcher to estimate how exactly the decision-making system is 
processed in the Sultanate.  Although it is not easy to make out the exact system that is 
used to make decisions in the country, it is clear that the decision-making process is 
highly centralized and Sultan Qaboos is at the center of it all, making decisions on what 
policies are to be issued and what are to be dropped or adopted. His influence on how 
the country is run is evident and he plays a critical role in the country’s foreign and 
domestic policy formulation and execution. Article 43 of the Basic Law gives him the 
mandate of assisting in the formulation of the general policies of the state, as well as 
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the implementation of the same policies by his appointed Cabinet and other related 
Councils (Al Shukaili, 2006). This also applies to the country’s approach adopted with 
regard to how foreign affairs issues are handled.  
It remains to be seen whether in the end, he will commit or allow the election 
or at least appointing someone as a prime minister who will take the responsibility for 
the country's foreign and domestic policy thus, developing a structural and institutional 
legitimacy that will effectively take over from him. It is not clear what the Sultan 
intends to do regarding this issue and this poses one of the many questions regarding 
the succession politics of the country. The succession challenges in Oman and the 
uncertainties in this aspect will be explained further in the coming Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY COMPONENTS ON 
DETERMINING OMAN’S CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY 
After examining the role of national identity in influencing Oman’s foreign 
policy and addressing the components that shape the country’s behavior in the regional 
and international arenas, this Chapter is devoted to highlight some of the major political 
incidents that took place in the region. In all of the examples provided, it is obvious that 
the components of national identity mentioned earlier play a major influence in 
determining Oman’s political stance from these cases. Obviously, this is consistent with 
the argument of this thesis. 
Examples of Oman’s Position on  some Regional and International Issues 
1. Oman-Iran Relations 
A majority of countries from the Gulf region particularly Saudi Arabia have, for 
a long time, had the worst diplomatic relations between themselves and Iran. States 
such as Bahrain, the UAE, and Kuwait, all belonging to the GCC have also adopted 
similar principles that Saudi Arabia has and their relations with Iran have not been the 
best to say the least (Rieger, 2013). The tension and geopolitical competition with Iran 
have been seen on numerous occasions particularly when the area has had to deal with 
regional conflicts, for instance, the recent local and regional conflicts in Yemen, Syria, 
as well as in Bahrain. While these countries have clearly regarded Iran is their 
adversary, Oman, on the other hand, has maintained very friendly relations and it is the 
only country that has done so in the region. 
Common interests and geography have brought Iran and Oman together and 
although these two countries share a cordial relationship today, it has not always been 
a friendly affair. The relationship between these two countries took shape after Sultan 
Qaboos accented to power in 1970 and was given military support from Britain, Jordan, 
and Iran to deal with the rebellion in Dhofar region. Around 1976, the Sultan attempted 
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to organize regional talks between the Gulf nations, Iraq, and Iran in order to bring them 
together and remove the historical misunderstandings but he was unable to gain the 
desired outcome as hostilities once again took center stage (Gresh, n.d). In the 1970s, 
the Iranian Revolution occurred and while countries in the Gulf were taking sides, 
Oman maintained a good relation with Tehran. Even at the height of the Iraq-Iran War, 
Oman remained neutral while a majority of countries in the Gulf supported Iraq. It is 
the country’s policy of pragmatism and remaining neutral while everyone else was 
taking sides among other factors that have enabled the two countries to maintain respect 
for each other (Said, 2014). 
The relationship between Iran and Oman serves Omani interests in a number of 
ways. First, it boosts the Omani economy by creating new prospects for economic co-
operation between the two countries. Second, it improves the level of trust between the 
two sides which enables Oman to act as a powerful mediator with the Iranians in solving 
many complicated issues and releasing western hostages held in Iran. Third, it enhances 
Oman's capacity and voice within the international arena and in the process of 
enhancing its image as a state that is strong politically not only within the Gulf region 
but also internationally. Fourth, it keeps the specter of military confrontation and war 
away from the Gulf region, particularly with regard to maintaining the stability of the 
Strait of Hormuz,  in turn, serving the internal security and stability interests of Oman 
and the region  (Neubauer, 2016).  
The Oman-Iran relations go over and above the diplomatic and political affairs 
including economic and military cooperation. Just recently in 2013, both Oman and 
Iran signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding to improve the two countries’ 
military corporation by jointly conducting military exercises along the Strait of 
Hormuz. In addition, Oman has made plans in the recent past of importing gas from the 
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oil and gas-rich Iran by developing a marine pipeline stretching from Iran to Oman 
(Ikerd, 2015). The two countries have also held talks of developing offshore gas fields. 
In a bid to maintain a cordial relationship between these two countries, Sultan Qaboos 
and other officials from Oman have made several diplomatic trips to Iran. 
2. Oman’s Position from the Syrian Crisis 
When the crisis in Syria erupted in 2011, Oman took a firm stand by denouncing 
the military operations that were focused on removing President Bashar al-Assad from 
power. Oman insisted on dialogue between the different factions so as to safeguard the 
interests of all parties concerned. Oman further supported the option of exploring all 
other avenues that would resolve the conflict in a peaceful way, always advocating for 
diplomacy and discouraging external interventions, arguing that the crisis in Syria was 
internal and that it could only be solved if the players came to a negotiating table and 
agreed on the terms. This was in line with Oman’s principles of peaceful resolution 
through dialogue and maintaining neutrality in its international relations policy. 
Nevertheless, this was a stand that was unpopular among the Gulf countries particularly 
with regard to the Syrian conflict (Cafiero & Karasik, 2016). To verify its neutrality, 
Oman maintained its embassy in Syria and kept it open. In addition, Sultan Qaboos 
instructed the Omani Foreign Minister to try and hold talks with his counterpart from 
Syria in a bid to promote peace and find an amicable solution to the internal challenges 
that the country was facing. 
The distinction that Oman enjoys as a country known to be a rational broker, 
even-handed, and neutral in crisis management earned it the mediator role in solving 
the issues that had engulfed Syria. Oman was not perceived to be biased towards the 
Iranian-Russian axis that supported president Bashar on the one hand, and nor was it 
perceived as aligned to the American-Western position, which was opposing Bashar al-
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Assad on the other hand. Despite Oman not being predisposed to geopolitical position 
alignment, it played a pivotal and critical role, particularly given that the two opposing 
sides, one that was supporting Assad and the other one that was against him, had so 
much in common in matters regarding military, economic, and political spheres 
(Echague, 2015). 
3. Oman and the GCC Union Proposal 
Oman refused to join the GCC Union right from the beginning and scholars note 
that observers from the Gulf were not surprised by this position but rather, they were 
shocked by the decisiveness of the country's stand. Oman was strongly opposed to 
joining the GCC Union and had even threatened to withdraw from the GCC during the 
Gulf Security Forum held in December 2013. The proposal to form the GCC Union had 
been made in 2011 during the GCC Summit. Oman declined to join the GCC Union for 
a number of reasons. First, Omani foreign policy can be described as cautious, non-
interventionist, dialogue-based, and peaceful. This policy sharply contrasts from other 
countries in the Gulf such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, who 
intervened in Syria and in Egypt in their respective conflicts with the provision of arms, 
media, and monetary support to influence different parties to the conflicts. This 
interference and intervention was not agreed upon on the basis of cooperation between 
the different countries in the Gulf; each country was acting independently and 
unilaterally and was doing this basically to advance self-interests (Saeed, 2014). In light 
of this, Oman did not find any reasonable or justifiable cause in the proposed formation 
of the GCC Union as there existed a lot of contradictions. 
Irrespective of other justifications, the most pressing and immediate reason for 
the proposal to form the GCC Union at that time was to confront Iran. This was 
specifically clear given that the formation of the GCC was, in particular, a reaction to 
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the threat of the Iranian Revolution spreading to other areas in the Gulf region. In 
addition, countries in the Gulf have, for a long time, perceived Iran as a direct threat to 
their sovereignty (Neubauer, 2016). This contradicted sharply with Oman’s stance of 
neutrality and Oman believed that rather than breed hostilities with Iran, it would be 
economically, politically, and strategically more feasible to consider it as an ally and to 
discontinue all aggression. In light of this, Oman refused to take part in the formation 
of the GCC Union. 
Like other countries from the Gulf, Oman was apprehensive of Saudi Arabia’s 
sovereignty and influence in the region and this was one of the influencing factors that 
discouraged it from joining or supporting the proposal to join the GCC Union given 
that it wanted to protect its own independence. More specifically, Oman was concerned 
about the expansion of Saudi Arabia's influence and its possible effects on religious 
coexistence and tolerance in its state. There were also a number of underlying issues 
between the GCC states that would have complicated the formation of the Union. For 
instance, there was bad blood between Saudis and Qataris and there was an open 
conflict between these two countries, which would have forced member states of the 
GCC to take sides. In addition, in 2011, Oman reportedly discovered a spy network 
belonging to the United Arab Emirates, which further deepened the differences 
(Reuters, 2011). Furthermore, Oman argued that the GCC countries had tried to unify 
the region through a common currency initiative, a venture that failed terribly owing to 
competition and disagreements within the participating member states (Saeed, 2014). 
The current Gulf crisis came to put more salt on the wound and thus became obvious 
that the GCC had moved further away from the proposal of the Union project. This 
proves the correctness of Oman’s position from the Union project mentioned above.  
Oman argued there were too many divisions among the participants, and as such, any 
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unification efforts would have been futile. 
4. Oman’s Position from Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen 
When dealing with the Yemeni crisis, Oman further showed its credentials as 
an even-handed, neutral, and responsible player. It shares more than 250km borderline 
with Yemen and the country run the risk of experiencing a spillover from the civil war 
that was developing in Yemen, which would have threatened the peace and stability of 
the whole region. Oman’s refusal to declare war against Yemen and its decision to 
maintain diplomatic relations with the country further confirmed its foreign policy that 
is geared towards remaining neutral and resolving conflicts peacefully (Freeman, 
2009). Despite many countries from the Gulf relocating their embassies from Sanaa to 
Aden, Oman refused to relocate its offices and this was in-line with its principle of non-
alignment with any position or side irrespective of the cost. 
Sultan Qaboos called for constructive dialogue between the conflicting parties. 
This was in line with its foreign policy principle of remaining neutral and non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. Its neighbors, nevertheless, engaged 
fully in partisanship and failure to bring the two sides to an amicable solution resulted 
in a military offensive in Yemen, supported by GCC countries against Houthi rebels. 
Oman, on the other hand, called on all parties to end the conflict before it got out of 
hands. To support this, Oman agreed to host a number of roundtable talks and provided 
security for delegations from both the United Nations and the Houthi rebels in a bid to 
stop the aggression from spilling over into the region. Whereas it was committed to 
bring the challenges that Yemen faced to an end, it was accused by Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC countries of being sympathetic to the rebels (Peterson, 2016). In response, 
Oman's Foreign Minister noted that the media had a lot of misconceptions regarding 
the Houthi rebels and the situation in Oman, and although many countries believed that 
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the situation in Yemen could be managed by the government, it was quite contentious 
and the Gulf initiative was not sufficient to fully bring the situation to a close. 
5. Oman’s Position from the Current Gulf Crisis 
In the midst of the ongoing diplomatic crisis in the Arabian Gulf where all 
countries belonging to the GCC have carried out a blockade against Qatar, Oman along 
with Kuwait have stayed put and avoided joining its neighbors in the diplomatic row 
(Cordesman, 2018). Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia issued 
statements to the effect that the countries were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar. The 
statements were subsequently followed by sea, air, and land blockades. This situation 
has complicated the geopolitical outlook in the Gulf given that all the member states 
share with each other common strategies and interests. While Kuwait opted to mediate 
the issue, Oman decided to stay out of the issue and reverted to its traditional role of 
pragmatism and remaining neutral and sought later on to support the Kuwaiti initiative 
(O’Toole, 2017). Oman’s political decision from this ongoing crisis can be understood 
from the interview made by DW German Channel with the Omani FM Yusuf bin Alawi. 
Bin Alawi assured that the Sultanate is supporting Kuwait’s initiative to resolve the 
dispute (The World News, 2019). It is worth noting that research indicates that Oman 
has been aiding Qatar to go round the blockade and thus challenging the quartet’s aim 
to isolate Qatar. While Oman opened its ports and airlines to the Qataris, its decision 
not to join the other countries in the blockade was interpreted as a sign of support for 
Qatar (O’Toole, 2017). 
The countries issuing blockades on Qatar have accused it of maintaining cordial 
relations with Iran, a country seen as a direct enemy of Saudi Arabia, and supporting 
terrorism through direct funding of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, 
and others affiliated to them, which have been declared as terrorist groups or 
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sympathizers. On the other hand, Qatar rejected the controversial list drawn by the Gulf 
countries as conditions, which constituted demands that had to be met before reinstating 
the diplomatic relations (Cordesman, 2018). Qatar accused these blockading countries 
of meddling with its sovereignty and refused to accept any of their demands, which led 
to further complicate the dilemma. Many people in Oman have refused to be drawn into 
the regional conflict. This refusal is in line with the country's long-held tradition of 
being a mediator and remaining nonpartisan in the region. As such, Oman opposes any 
sudden changes imposed on any country or on the region, hoping to maintain the 
geopolitical framework of the Gulf as it is (O’Toole, 2017). Muscat desires to maintain 
the regional peace and this is mirrored in the attitudes of its residents. 
Challenges Facing Oman's Foreign Policy 
The biggest internal risk affecting the country relates to the economy. Oman’s 
state finances have been severely damaged by low oil prices, which further underscore 
the economic risks of over-relying on only one sector of the economy. Oman depends 
highly on the petroleum sector, which is said to comprise approximately 85% of the 
country's GDP (Fasano & Iqbal, 2003). Although the country is committed to creating 
other revenue streams in a bid to diversify its options, it lacks the enormous oil and gas 
supplies that other Arab countries have, which puts more pressure on the country’s need 
to fast track this transition.  
The Sultan has managed to bring together different people from the opposing 
divide. There are fears that once he is gone, groups such as the Islamic State and Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and extremist groups (Page, Challita, & 
Harris, 2011) originating from Yemen will threaten Oman's security. These fears are 
based on the current trends whereby groups such as the Islamic State has managed to 
control huge areas in Iraq and in Syria, whereas others such as AQAP have gained 
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control over Yemen's Hadramawt region, including strategic key posts such as Mukalla, 
one of the main seaports, which is situated only a hundred miles from Salalah in Oman 
(Batati, 2015). At the moment, nonetheless, Oman is in a relatively good position with 
regards to safety given that it has installed strict border controls that monitor movement 
into and out of the country. In addition, the country does not have common attributes 
that are necessary to develop extremism and its national pillars of non-violence, 
dialogue, and tolerance have, over the years, determined what kind of relationship that 
Oman’s diverse tribal and religious communities will have all through the reign of 
Sultan Qaboos. 
In the wider geopolitical context of the country's position within the Gulf region, 
Oman plays a critical role in the balance of power in the Middle East and serves as a 
powerful diplomatic channel between its fellow GCC countries and their close allies 
from the west on the one side, and Iran on the other side. In the recent past, as a result 
of direct efforts by Sultan Qaboos, Oman has managed to strengthen and deepen 
cooperation between itself and Iran and these two countries have collaborated on 
different spheres such as security, energy, economy, and diplomacy. Although the 
relationship between Oman and Iran has not directly affected its position and standing 
within the GCC member states, it has been accused on several occasions for its 
independent foreign policy and how such a policy undermines the collective security of 
the GCC. In the recent past, besides the ongoing controversial issue regarding Iran, 
Oman was heavily criticized for its position on Qatar being the only member from the 
Gulf States to have maintained a good relationship when others were issuing sanctions 
left right and center (Cafiero & Karasik, 2016). The criticism will continue if the 
country carries on with its policies in the post-Qaboos era, and it is feared that continued 
finger-pointing and criticism might negatively affect future relations. 
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Oman is a close ally of both Britain and the US and more particularly these 
countries collaborate in the military and security front. However, there is immense 
pressure on Oman particularly emanating from the GCC region touching on the same 
issue of these military partnerships between Muscat, London, and Washington. Oman 
is keen on maintaining low visibility and its policy of non-partisanship, which has 
helped to maintain its security in the region, is greatly affected by these partnerships as 
there is the inherent risk of extremists looking at Oman as a tool of the two western 
countries. In spite of Oman being a close ally of the US, on numerous occasions, it has 
disagreed with it on a number of regional issues, which include but not limited to 
strategies of how to combat the Islamic State and its 2003 invasion of Iraq (Cordesman, 
2018).  
Therefore, in post-Sultan Qaboos era, there are fears that the next leader will be 
heavily weighed down by these geopolitical and international diplomatic issues and 
must strike the right balance going by the country's long-held traditions of pragmatism, 
nonpartisanship, independence, and politeness in how it approaches and manages its 
foreign policy. The next leader may inherit a huge responsibility of maintaining the 
right balance in a region that has a lot of geopolitical positions at play. He may face 
many challenges such as how to uphold and maintain the legacy of Sultan Qaboos, how 
to avoid unsettling new and old friends and managing the expectations of all players in 
the region (Valeri, 2015). Therefore, there is a risen concern that the new leader may 
have a huge burden to deal with and the uncertainty of what might transpire after 
Qaboos’s exit is an issue that still needs to be addressed.  
Another crucial challenge is that the civil society in the Sultanate is fairly absent 
from the decision-making system. A large segment of the society is discontented with 
not being involved in decision-making and not being consulted on some political issues. 
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For example, Oman’s position from the sudden and unexpected rapprochement with 
Israel and the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Muscat in October 
2018 drew widespread criticisms among Omanis, who expressed their dissatisfaction 
with this rapprochement. There are some voices demanding from the Omani 
government to, at least, involve their representatives in the Consultative Council with 
regard to some critical issues of foreign policy (Al Mahrami, 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, Oman’s foreign policy is highly dependent on the 
individual orientations of Sultan Qaboos and there is a lack of an institutional policy-
making system that decision process is based on. Lefebvre (2010) argues that the 
decision-making in Oman has developed based on wisdom and not on an institutionally 
based system and also it is highly attributed to the person of Sultan Qaboos. The Omani 
Foreign Ministry does not have specialized political experts like in the US departments 
for instance. This matter raises skepticism and uncertainty about the continuity of 
Oman’s political approach in the long term, especially after the reign of Sultan Qaboos. 
Therefore, there is a growing concern about the country's political situation 
particularly in the near future given that there is no well-established framework for 
guiding the succession process. This atmosphere of uncertainty raises important 
questions regarding the country's ability to maintain a stable state of affairs in the post-
sultan Qaboos era (Valeri, 2015). The following section will delve further to highlight 
the potential succession challenges that Oman may face in the future.  
Succession Challenges 
The succession process in Oman is, to some extent, problematic and there is 
uncertainty of whether Oman will maintain its foreign policy orientation after Qaboos’s 
reign. However it is unlikely that it will change its foreign policy dramatically, 
especially with respect to some files such as its relation with Iran, as the components 
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of its national identity will continue to determine the action and behavior of any future 
leader in the Sultanate (Lefebvre, 2010). The geographical aspect and the maritime 
chokepoint they share will still function as an influential component and will prompt 
the two countries to keep communicating and maintaining their mutual relations. 
Nevertheless, questions regarding how events will unfold after the vacancy of 
the leadership position of Sultan Qaboos have always been raised given the underlying 
challenges and complexities that surround the political outlook of the country. Unlike 
other countries in the GCC that have adopted hereditary monarchy systems with a 
Crown Prince already known, Oman's political succession is complicated by the fact 
that Sultan Qaboos is yet to produce a male heir (Henderson, 2017). As aforementioned, 
the country's Basic Law, which was ratified in 1995, many have believed that the 
country will transform into a constitutional monarchy (Lefebvre, 2010). Based on the 
experience in Oman, scholars contend that in the recent past, the monarchies have made 
great advancements than the republics of the Arabian Peninsula since they have 
implemented progressive economic and political reforms. 
Given the Ibadi Muslim tradition, Oman's basic law provides for the selection 
and not for the political election of an individual who will succeed Sultan Qaboos. But 
given that the Sultan has not produced a son who would be the direct heir of the throne, 
it is unclear whether the political transition after the vacancy of Sultan’s position would 
be problematic or not. However, political disputes always bring about tension and 
Oman has not been tested enough to provide a track record given that Sultan Qaboos 
has been in power since the 1970s (Valeri, 2015). What remains to be certain is the fact 
that his absence might create a political vacuum given that there is no direct successor 
to the throne. 
Given the history of the Ibadi Muslims, one would expect that the political 
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transition in Oman that will take place in the future will be orderly and peaceful and 
will be characterized by minimum political instabilities if any. Ibadi Muslims stress on 
the “rule of the just” and try to avoid political violence and intolerance. Various indices 
rank Oman highly in terms of national stability. For instance, the Fund for Peace and 
Foreign Policy magazine noted that Oman falls in the category of the countries with the 
least risk potential for political upheaval (Baabood, 2016). Nevertheless, all this might 
change given the regional instabilities and lack of a suitable individual or structure to 
provide for the succession. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION AND LIMITATIONS 
Oman’s national identity is affected by a number of factors. One of these factors 
is the country's history. Scholars have noted that what gives nationalism strength are its 
ethnic heritage, symbols, traditions, and memories (Yavuz, 1998). The collective 
elements of national identity comprise of national achievement, national experiences, 
traditions, and symbols, and all these are rooted in a country's history. Oman has a rich 
history that is centered on the Islamic religion (Wilkinson, 1964). The Sultanate has 
had multiple contacts with different people from different parts of the world, who have 
engaged the country either through trade or military contest or even migration such as 
was the case with the Persians. Oman’s historical account is important because it 
explains how the country’s identity has been formed and more in particular, how its 
identity has been shaped by historical events. Different groups have migrated into 
Oman all through history and they have also helped to enrich the country's multi-
culturalism. The Persians, together with Arabs, British, the Portuguese, and others were 
expanding their settlements in Oman during these early times, in turn, had led to 
developing Omani consciousness to resist any presence of foreign powers intervention 
(Riphenburg, 1998). The delegation sent by Prophet Muhammad also played a critical 
role in shaping the country's religious beliefs and practices and by extension, its identity 
as a country that abides by the teachings of the Islamic faith (Gubash, 2014). 
Oman's geographical location has also played an important role in forming its 
foreign policy, and has, by extension, impacted heavily on its identity. Scholars have 
noted that the perception of life, values, norms, and expectations are influenced by 
geography. Oman's geographical placement is also strategic given that it shares a 
maritime border with Iran, which also has one of the most important maritime channels 
in the name of Strait of Hormuz (Rodrigue, 2004). This Strait is a maritime choke point 
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and this has also helped to shape the country's identity and foreign policy, particularly 
when considering its relation with Iran. Strait of Hormuz is important for the path 
connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, as well as the Arabian Sea. Oman 
and Iran are the only two countries that share a maritime border in the Strait of Hormuz 
and the threat of closure of this channel has forced the two countries to maintain a 
cordial relationship for their mutual benefits and generally, for the whole region’s 
interest. The strategic location of Oman has also influenced its leader, Sultan Qaboos, 
to maintain good relations with all its neighbors and international partners as a strategy 
of safeguarding its sovereignty, which has in the past being constantly threatened by 
aggression from Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and other countries. 
The dominant actor within the Oman state is Sultan Qaboos. The research has 
shown that he is the main figurehead who drives the foreign policy of the Sultanate of 
Oman (Al Mahrami, 2014). Qaboos has been markedly consistent during times of 
relative calm and in times when the country faces major regional disturbance. Most 
fundamental to this consistency is his policy of promoting peace and unity both 
regionally and domestically, as well as his policy of independence, non-interference, 
and pragmatism. Whereas these objectives are, in part, occasioned by having adopted a 
classic small-state security strategy, they do not expressly explain the approach and 
reasons behind the foreign policy. As such, although it has been addressed in this paper, 
it is of paramount importance to reiterate the country's political history and how it has 
influenced the country's approach towards state security and perceptions of the same. 
The country's history indicates that it has been engulfed in a protracted internal 
dispute and instability and has been facing external aggression from some of its 
neighbors since the earliest time in history. Since the mid-18th century at the time Al 
Said Dynasty was at the helm, successive leaders have traditionally contacted with 
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foreign powers, mainly Britain and France, for both internal and external safety. Britain, 
in particular, has played a critical role over the years to protect against challenges posed 
by imamate to the Sultanate’s authority. The historical theme of the Ibadhi doctrine has 
been based on the rejection of any external power influence, and when the time some 
of the Al Said rulers got overdependence on assistance from Britain, there was a 
growing dissatisfaction of interior tribes against this policy. Over the years, this resulted 
in entrenched domestic divisions, economic hardships, and has created a lot of 
vulnerability for the country. 
Internal instabilities had weakened the country's ability to safeguard and protect 
its people and coupled with external interference from Persians and the Portuguese only 
made the country more susceptible to foreign occupation. In addition, the British policy 
in the country cemented and hardened divisions between the tribes and the Al Said 
authority. The main reasons behind the conflict between the Imamate and the Sultans 
were because of the rejection by the Imamate of the long-held practice of inheriting 
power as it was the custom by the Sultanate while the Ibadhi had a tradition of elected 
officials through consensus.  
The emphasis put by Sultan Qaboos on unity and independence is visible in the 
foreign policy outcomes of the country. Oman participated fully, although behind the 
scenes, in the mediation talks between Iran and the US. Oman’s position from this issue 
stemmed from the fact that being in contact with the Iranians enhances the region’s 
security and interest than hostility. Sultan Qaboos has also secured economic benefits 
both for the region and for his country through his efforts of promoting commerce and 
trade between the party member states of the GCC, as well as international partners. 
Besides, to preserve political relationships, Sultan Qaboos regularly approaches 
contentious foreign policy issues with independence and always emphasizes on 
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maintaining good ties with all countries as a way of safeguarding and promoting 
harmony.  
As regards the territorial disputes in the region, Sultan Qaboos has adopted the 
policy of maintaining a neutral stance and this illustrates that a country can gain much 
by adopting such a foreign policy approach. This strategy has worked and the country 
is technically safe from external aggression. When most of the Gulf countries have 
opted to sideline Iran because of its international policies with regard to supporting 
extremism, Oman has consistently declined to take that route of isolating the country 
from regional conflicts. Since 1979 when Iran experienced a revolution, Oman has 
always remained neutral even refusing to take sides during the decade-long Iran-Iraq 
war. At some point, Sultan Qaboos even attempted to form regional unity by requesting 
that the other countries incorporate Yemen, Iran, and Iraq to the GCC’s security 
architecture during the time the discussions about the formation of the regional 
organization were taking place.  
Oman's policy of remaining neutral and maintaining independence and 
pragmatism is even seen today. In the end, Oman’s foreign policy can be interpreted in 
two ways. It mirrors its rather narrow capacities as a small country attempting to deal 
with the threats of insecurity. Yet it approaches these matters uniquely from how other 
smaller states approach them. It, therefore, rests upon us to look much deeper at the role 
that local state factors play in how the country manages the many perceptions of threat. 
It is easy to find that it is a national identity, an extension of its protracted political, 
social, and rich history that shapes its unique foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, as the transformative leader continues to age, the country will 
ultimately require a new leader at some point. The country’s next ruler, who is not 
known and is yet to be determined, will take over power from the overly successful 
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Sultan and his legacy, which is defined by his foreign policy and domestic governance, 
and one that has placed the country at the heart of international and regional security 
matters. Sultan Qaboos is not only popular within the local circles, but he is also hailed 
and revered as a transformative leader by citizens of the surrounding states (Valeri, 
2009). Nevertheless, the incoming leader may encounter many international and local 
challenges that represent risks to the country's sovereignty and stability.  
In sum, and to conclude this study, it could be argued that as humanitarian and 
political crises are experienced by many Arab countries, Oman remains a beacon of 
quietude and calmness in a region that is characterized by civil unrest and instability, 
stemming these features from its unique components of national identity. This identity 
has had a profound impact on the social and political structure of the country and thus, 
serves as an immune system that prevents society from being exposed to the threat of 
extremism, terrorism and sectarian conflicts, suffered by many nations. Such success 
did not come from a vacuum, rather it is a mixture of many components as discussed 
throughout the research. In addition, the country's unique stability and cohesion are 
primarily attributed to Sultan Qaboos and his legitimacy, bearing in mind that he enjoys 
an extraordinary legacy and he happens to be the second longest-serving ruler in the 
world after the Queen of Britain. He is also the only leader still in power from as early 
as the 1970s. Since he took over power from his father, Qaboos has been able to 
transform the Sultanate from a fractured state that was overly dependent on aid into one 
of the key players in the region with a strong military alliance with both Britain and the 
US, and on the other hand maintaining good relations with Iran. 
This conclusion is consistent with the argument and the hypothesis of this 
research which states that Oman’s contemporary foreign policy which is characterized 
by neutral and independent approach is driven largely by the impact of national identity 
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and its components. It is expected that this identity will continue to determine the action 
of any future leadership in Oman, especially with regard to some crucial and significant 
issues, such as the relationship with Iran and, on the other hand, maintain its 
international strategic allies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. This 
conclusion should take into consideration the challenges the Sultanate might face in the 
future as discussed earlier.  
Limitations and Recommendations  
In conducting this study, some limitations and constraints have emerged. Given 
that a qualitative method of both primary and secondary resources have been used in 
analyzing this study, only a limited number of documents was collected from the 
aforementioned institutions in Oman. It was expected to collect wide varieties of 
documents and archives to further enrich the study. However, the process was not as 
easy as expected due to serious restrictions and complexities to reach some other 
important documents. The documents that address how the government has reacted in 
some crucial issues are strictly not accessible to academic works, particularly 
documents that reflect Oman’s role in the Iranian nuclear deal. There are two reasons 
behind these constraints. Firstly, most of the Gulf monarchical governments are 
characterized by a very restrictive information policy in contrast to western 
governments. Secondly, the foreign policy of most of the Arabian Gulf monarchies has 
always been a pragmatic strategic balancing act. Therefore, the publication of 
documents that trace the foreign policy decision-making system of these countries may 
cause negative impacts to the regimes, both in the domestic and foreign aspects. 
Another limitation is related to the difficulty in finding enough literature that highlight 
foreign policy from an identity perspective. Although this could be perceived as an 
advantage point and added value to this study given that it would increase its 
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significance, rare literature in this area has created some challenges, as it required more 
time and effort.  
One of the recommendations or suggestions for future research in the studied 
area is to use a mixed research method. A qualitative method could be combined with 
a quantitative method to further analyze the issue from a wider perspective. Conducting 
a questionnaire as well as interviewing some of the Omani officials in the political 
sphere along with other experts and academics may further enrich the study. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: an Article published in the American Foreign Service Journal in 1934. 
It is about an official visit of the American Minister Paul Knabenshue to Muscat 
for the purpose of celebrating a century of the treaty of trade and friendship signed 
between Oman and US in 1834. 
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Appendix B: Another article published in an American journal in 1938. 
It is about an official visit of Sultan Said bin Taimur to Washington, celebrating 
105 years of the Omani-US treaty of friendship.   
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Appendix C: Some of the documents shown in the State Hermitage Museum in Saint 
Petersburg, Russia. 
The Museum is the second-largest art museum in the world. The documents 
shown are letters exchanged between Sultan Faisal bin Turki and some of the Russian 
figures (1884-1905). 
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Appendix D: Letters exchanged between Said bin Sultan to some Iranian figures (1855-
1856). 
 
 
 
 
 
